Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus (Research Notes)

Reproduction of Production Conditions
In the past, when I discussed production activities as a necessary condition for the renewal of means of production, there was something in my analysis that was only briefly mentioned or merely an accompanying implicit line. Now I want to reveal it more fully and study it in its own right. As Marx said, a social form cannot sustain itself for a year without reproducing the conditions of production while engaging in production activities. Even children know this. Therefore, the ultimate condition of production is the reproduction of various production conditions. It can be "simple" (to be precise, the reproduction of the prerequisites of production) or it can be a form of "expanded scale" (an expansion on simple reproduction). Let us temporarily set aside this distinction. So, what is the reproduction of production conditions? Here we will enter a field that has been very familiar to people since the publication of Volume II of Capital, yet has been precisely overlooked. Taking the perspective of production in isolation, or even the simple practice of production (which is abstractly related to the production process), the perspective itself has a fixed obviousness (a type of empirical ideological obviousness). These two perspectives are so seamlessly integrated into our daily "consciousness" that to prompt everyone to accept the perspective of reproduction, while not entirely impossible, is extremely difficult. However, without this perspective, everything is merely fantasy (distortion is worse than one-sidedness), even at the level of production, let alone at the level of pure practice. Let us try to study this issue step by step. In short, once we acknowledge that every social form originates from a dominant mode of production, we can assert that the production process must operate within certain production relations and is constrained by them. The conclusion that follows is: for survival, and to be able to produce, every social form must simultaneously engage in the reproduction of production conditions. Therefore, it must involve: 1. the reproduction of productive forces, and 2. the reproduction of existing production relations. The reproduction of means of production was convincingly demonstrated by Marx in Volume II of Capital, where he argued that without the reproduction of material means of production, there can be no production activity. Now, everyone (including bourgeois economists funded by the state or those modern "macroeconomic" theorists) recognizes this. Even economists of average competence know that each year it is necessary to clarify in advance what is needed to replace losses in production, such as raw materials, fixed facilities (factories), production tools (machines), etc. This is the most basic common sense. Economists of average competence also understand this. I say average-level economists = average-level capitalists because they both adopt the perspective of enterprise management, merely contenting themselves with commenting on the actual financial accounting of enterprise management. Fortunately, Quesnay was the first to raise this "obvious" question, and fortunately, Marx answered it. These two geniuses made us understand that we cannot think about the reproduction of material means of production at the level of enterprise management, because at that level, such reproduction does not exist within its actual conditions. What occurs at the level of enterprise management is merely a material effect; it only provides a notion of the necessity of reproduction, and absolutely does not provide conditions and mechanisms for reproduction that can be scrutinized. Reflecting on this is sufficient to prove this point. A capitalist, Mr. X, who runs a yarn factory, must engage in the "reproduction" of raw materials and machinery. However, his own factory does not produce these things. They are produced by Mr. Y, an Australian rancher, and Mr. Z, an engineer engaged in machinery manufacturing. With their products, Mr. X can carry out the reproduction of production conditions. And Mr. Y and Mr. Z must also reproduce their own production conditions to produce these products. Similarly, their reproduction conditions also depend on the products of other capitalists. This can go on endlessly. Whether in the domestic market or the international market, this is how it operates; the satisfaction of the demand for means of production (serving reproduction) depends on market supply. This mechanism leads to an "endless chain." To scrutinize it, one must follow the "global" process elucidated by Marx, especially studying the relationship between the capital circulation in Volume II and III of Capital concerning the first category (the production of means of production) and the second category (the production of consumer goods), as well as the issue of the realization of surplus value. We will not delve deeper into this. It is clear that to engage in production, the objective existence of the reproduction of material conditions must be acknowledged, and there is no need for lengthy exposition.

Reproduction of Labor Power
However, there is a question that readers will not overlook. We have discussed the reproduction of means of production, but we have not yet addressed the reproduction of productive forces. The concept of labor power distinguishes productive forces from means of production, and the reproduction of labor power is precisely the issue we have just overlooked. From our observations of enterprise management, particularly from the examination of actual financial accounting for projected installment payments and investments, we can obtain the objective existence of the material process of reproduction.

In specific terms, it is only within the realm where the economic base determines the role of the superstructure that it corresponds to the real situation. The force of the upper structure determined by the ultimate decisive role of the economic base marks the interaction of the various levels of the superstructure. Marxism traditionally holds two aspects: (1) the relative independence of the superstructure with respect to the economic base; (2) the interaction of the superstructure over the economic base. Lenin's State and Revolution clearly states that the state is a repressive apparatus. Therefore, we can say that the Marxist map, i.e., the theoretical metaphor of the building (the base and the superstructure), is very strict in this regard. The state is a machine of coercion that ensures the ruling class (in the 19th century, the bourgeoisie) maintains its dominance over the working class. This is crucial. It indicates that it is the base that ultimately determines the entire building. As a conclusion, it forces us to raise the question of the type of derived force that is unique to the superstructure. This theory compels us to consider the mutual interaction of the superstructure and the economic base in relation to the issue of surplus value extraction (i.e., the issue of dependence, which means it compels us to think about the Marxist tradition).

Thus, the state is primarily referred to by Marxist classical writers as the state machine. This term not only refers to (in a narrow sense) specialized machines (related to legal practices, such as police, courts, prisons, which recognize the necessity of specialized machines), but also refers to the army, which directly intervenes in situations with its coercive force (the proletariat has paid a price for this experience), taking "emergency actions" and its special forces, as well as the heads of state, government, and administrative institutions above all this. Just as this form presents, Marxist-Leninist theory of the state touches upon substantial points. The substantial point is that there is no doubt that the elements that make things exist and the facts presented are characterized by the nature of the superstructure based on the reproduction foundation, and it is possible and necessary to reflect on this. Although the metaphor of the building indicates the existence of many issues, it cannot provide conceptual answers to these issues. Once people adopt the perspective of reproduction, these issues will immediately become clear. Just as I have pointed out, without adopting the perspective of reproduction, it is impossible to pose (and answer) these questions regarding the building metaphor (the lower structure and the upper structure). The qualitative explanation above is still only a partial description. I will conduct a brief analysis of law, the state, and ideology from this perspective. At the same time as adopting the perspective of reproduction, I will also reveal the truth from the perspectives of practice and production.

In other words, schools (as well as other state institutions such as churches, or other state machines like the army) teach "specialized knowledge," which formally guarantees submission to the ruling ideology, or ensures the control of the ruling ideology in practice. All those who implement production, agents of exploitation and oppression, not to mention those "ideological specialists" (in Marx's words), in order to "fulfill their duties," will inevitably be "influenced" by the ruling ideology in some way, whether they are the exploited (the proletariat) or the exploiters (the bourgeoisie). The dependents of the exploiters (managers) and the high priests of the ruling ideology (employees), and so on, are all like this. Here it is revealed that the necessary conditions for the reproduction of labor power are not only the reproduction of labor skills but also the reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology. Even with this "not only... but also..." it is still not sufficient, because it is clear that the preparation for the reproduction of labor skills is provided in the form of submission to ideology and is constrained by it. This requires acknowledging the effective existence of a new entity: ideology. Here I want to make two points. First, I must complete the analysis of reproduction. I have just briefly outlined the forms of the reproduction of productive forces (i.e., the reproduction of means of production) and the forms of the reproduction of labor power. However, I have not yet addressed the issue of the reproduction of production relations. This is a crucial issue for Marxist theory regarding modes of production. Overlooking this issue would be a theoretical error—a serious political mistake, to put it bluntly. Therefore, I will discuss this issue here. But to adhere to the logic of the discussion method, I will take a detour. Second, to take this detour, I will need to reintroduce the question I raised earlier: What is society?

I have emphasized several times the revolutionary nature of the Marxist concept of "social totality" to distinguish it from Hegel's concept of "totality." I have said (and the following arguments are merely a repetition of the famous propositions of historical materialism) that Marx envisions each society as a structure composed of "levels" or "instances." It has a specific segmentation, namely, divided into the lower structure or economic base (the "unity" of productive forces and production relations) and the upper structure. The upper structure includes two "levels" or "instances": one is political—legal (law and state), and the other is ideological (different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.). This image not only has enlightening benefits theoretically (it reveals the distinction between Marx and Hegel) but also has significant theoretical strengths: it makes it possible to remember what I call the force marks of each of its basic concepts within its theoretical mechanism. What does this mean? Viewing the image of each social structure as a building with two "floors" on a foundation (the lower structure), it is obviously a metaphor: more precisely, it is a spatial metaphor: a topography metaphor. Like every metaphor, it suggests something, makes something visible. What does it suggest and make visible? Precisely, the upper floor will not "stand" (in the air) if it does not sit precisely on the foundation. The purpose of the building metaphor is to emphasize the "ultimate determining role" of the economic base, and the effect it produces endows the economic base with a force mark. This mark has become widely known due to a famous saying: what happens in the upper "floor" (i.e., the upper structure) is ultimately determined by what happens in the economic base. Determined by this "ultimate" force mark, the various "levels" of the upper structure are explicitly assigned different force marks. What are these marks divided into? Since the various levels of the upper structure depend on the force of the economic base, it can be said that the various levels of the upper structure do not have an ultimate determining role. If their determining role has its specific way, it is only within the realm where the economic base determines the role that it corresponds to the real situation. I will frequently use the adjective "descriptive" from now on. To avoid ambiguity in meaning, it becomes necessary to explain the terminology.

When referring to the building metaphor or the Marxist theory of the state, whenever I say these are descriptive concepts or objects, I have no intention of criticism. On the contrary, I have reason to believe that great scientific discoveries must go through what I call the "descriptive theory" stage. This is the first stage of all theories, at least in the realm relevant to us (the realm of social science). However, the descriptive theory of the state represents only one stage in the entire theory of the state, and this theory itself must seek to replace this stage. The definition of the state just mentioned links the facts of coercion with the state, treating the state as a coercive state machine. If this connection indeed provides us with a method to prove and understand these facts, then it is very clear that this "mutual relationship" leads to a very specific obviousness. I have previously hinted at this. The precise meaning of the above explanation is: "Yes, that's it, it is indeed true!"

(1) The "descriptive theory" is undoubtedly the irreversible beginning stage of theory, but (2) the theory presented in descriptive form precisely demands the development of theory itself in a "contradictory" effect. Thus, theory develops in the process of surpassing the "descriptive" form. Let us turn to the current topic—the state—to further clarify the above concepts.

When I mention the Marxist theory of the state, I mean to supplement this classical definition with some additions. The descriptive "theory" is undoubtedly the beginning of Marxist state theory; secondly, this beginning specifies substantial points, meaning it sets the principles for every later development of Marxist state theory. Let me first clarify a point: the state (and its existence in the state machine) has no meaning if it does not function as state power. All political class struggles revolve around the state. What I mean is that sometimes it is a certain class that possesses (seizes and holds) state power, and sometimes it is a coalition of classes or a partial alliance of classes that jointly possesses state power. This explanation compels me to divide state power (maintaining or possessing) into two aspects: one is the political class struggle's purpose, and the other is the state machine.

In this regard, we must carefully enter a field. Earlier, Marxist writers had already entered this field, but they did not systematize the theory in form. The decisive theoretical progress was only hinted at in their experiences and statements, and their experiences and methods mainly limited to the realm of political practice. In the political practice of Marxist classical writers, they regarded the actual state as more complex than the "Marxist definition of the state." Even if this definition is more complex, they still thought so. They recognized this complexity in practice but did not provide corresponding discussions in theory.

I outline a rough framework for this corresponding theory. To develop state theory, it is necessary to pay attention not only to the distinction between state power and the state machine but also to another type of entity that supports (coercive) state machines. One must not confuse these entities with (coercive) state machines. I call these entities ideological state machines. To summarize the "Marxist theory of the state," it will become clear that Marxist classical writers always assert:

(1) The state is a coercive state machine; (2) state power and state machines must be distinguished; (3) class struggle is directed against state power, so the class (or alliance of classes, or partial alliance of classes) that holds state power uses the functions of state machines to achieve their class goals.

This explanation leads me to the need to clarify what ideological state machines are.

What are ideological state machines?
(1) The state is a coercive state machine; (2) state power and state machines must be distinguished; (3) class struggle is directed against state power, so the class (or alliance of classes, or partial alliance of classes) that holds state power uses the functions of state machines to achieve their class goals.

This explanation leads me to the need to clarify what ideological state machines are.

Ideological state machines cannot be confused with (coercive) state machines. So, what constitutes the distinction between them?

First, it is clear that there is only one (coercive) state machine, but there are many ideological state machines. It can even be inferred that the existence of this "many" is because the unit factors that constitute the plurality of ideological state machines as an entity are not unified.

Second, the unified (coercive) state machine entirely belongs to the public domain; ideological state machines, on the contrary, are an obvious decentralized system, with a large part belonging to the private domain. Churches, political parties, trade unions, families, certain schools, most newspapers, various cultural speculative enterprises, etc.

People may overlook the first point, but certainly, someone will question the second point. They may ask why I believe that most institutions of ideological state machines do not have public status but are merely private. As a conscious Marxist, Gramsci has already refuted this objection. The distinction between public and private is a distinction within bourgeois law, which has a solid basis in the (subordinate) domain because bourgeois law exercises "authority" precisely in this domain. However, such a distinction does not exist in the state domain, for the state is "above the law." The state is the state of the ruling class; it is neither public nor private, and precisely the opposite, it is the state that determines the distinction between public and private.

Starting from the study of ideological state machines, one would arrive at the same conclusion. The institutions we recognize as "public" or "private" are not important; what matters is how they function. As private institutions of ideological state machines, they can effectively perform their functions. A rigorous rational analysis of any ideological state machine can now lead us to the substantive issues.

The fundamental difference between ideological state machines and coercive state machines is that coercive state machines function through "violent means," while ideological state machines function through "ideological means." I will refine my statement about this difference to clarify the issue. Every state machine, whether coercive or ideological, functions through both violent means and ideological means. However, there is a very important distinction that can completely avoid the confusion between ideological state machines and (coercive) state machines.

The (coercive) state machine primarily and mainly uses coercive means (including personal coercion) to perform its functions, and only then uses ideological means. This is a fact. (There is absolutely no purely coercive machine.) For example, the army and police also utilize ideological methods to exercise their functions because it ensures internal unity and guarantees the "self-justification" they proclaim to the outside world.

The form is the same, but let’s reverse it: ideological state machines primarily and mainly utilize ideological means to perform their functions, and only then use coercive means, although in the ultimate sense, it is merely diluted, concealed, or even symbolic. (There is absolutely no purely ideological machine.) Schools and churches use punishments, expulsions, dismissals, etc., to discipline teachers and pastors, as well as students and congregants. The truth of the family is similar, and the truth of cultural ideological state machines is also the same (especially censorship), and I will not enumerate them all.

Coercive means and ideological means determine the dual (primary and secondary) functions of state machines. This dual function, whether belonging to (coercive) state machines or ideological state machines, illustrates the very obvious yet subtly defined (or tacit) combination formed by the mutual influence of the two types of state machines. Is it necessary to supplement this further? Daily life provides us with countless examples, but if we are not satisfied with mere observation and want to go further, we must study these examples closely.

The above discussion still guides us to understand what constitutes the unit elements of the seemingly distinct individual ideological state machines. If ideological state machines primarily and mainly utilize ideological means to function, then it is this function that unifies their diversity. As for the ideology they use to function, it is ultimately unified under the ruling ideology, even though there are differences and contradictions between it and the ruling ideology. This ruling ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. Given that the "ruling class" essentially holds state power (publicly, but more often in the form of alliances between classes or partial alliances), and possesses the (coercive) state machines at their disposal, we will acknowledge that the aforementioned ruling class has the initiative in ideological state machines, such that in the ultimate sense, the ruling ideology is realized within the ideological state machines, specifically, realized within its opposition.

Acting through laws and decrees in (coercive) state machines is fundamentally different from acting through the ruling ideology in ideological state machines. We must delve into the details of the differences between the two, but this difference does not obscure their deep-seated unity. To my knowledge, any class that does not place the ideological state machines under its control and exercise its hegemony within them while holding state power will not maintain its rule for long. I will provide one example to prove this point: Lenin was particularly concerned with the revolutionization of the educational ideological state machine, intending to make it serve the Soviet proletariat that had already seized power, to ensure the future consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship and the transition to socialism.

From the above explanation, it can be understood that ideological state machines can not only serve as markers of territorial boundaries but can also be sites of class struggle—often intense class struggle. The ruling class (or class alliance) cannot easily enact laws in ideological state machines as it can in (coercive) state machines. This is not only because the ruling class can maintain its strong position in ideological state machines for a long time, but also because the exploited class can find various ways to resist within ideological state machines, whether by exploiting contradictions within the ruling class or by defeating their arguments in debates.

Now let me summarize.

If the propositions I have put forward can be established, I will trace back to the classic Marxist theory of the state and make one of its points more precise. I believe it is necessary to distinguish between state power and the state machine under the leadership of state agents executing the ruling class's class struggle. Moreover, I also believe that the state machine includes two types of institutional units: those representing coercive state machines and those representing the different individual units of ideological state machines. If the above is accepted, then the following questions arise: What is the scope of the functions of ideological state machines? On what basis can we say they are important? In other words, if these ideological state machines operate not through coercion but through ideology, what do their functions correspond to?

On the Reproduction of Production Relations
The central question that has remained unresolved in the lengthy discussion above is: How is the reproduction of production relations guaranteed? Now I can answer this. If I were to speak in the language of topography (lower and upper structures), I would say: the reproduction of production relations is largely guaranteed by the legal-political and ideological superstructure. However, I believe the essence of the problem lies in transcending this descriptive language. Therefore, I would rather say: the reproduction of production relations is largely guaranteed by the (ruling class) exercising certain functions within the state machine (both coercive state machines and ideological state machines).

It is essential to note what I just discussed; it now gathers into the following three characteristic forms:

All state machines operate through both coercion and ideology. The distinction lies in that (coercive) state machines primarily and mainly use coercive means, while ideological state machines primarily and mainly utilize ideological means.
(Coercive) state machines form an organized whole, attached to a directive body, while ideological state machines are a pluralistic composite, each differing from one another, relatively independent, and can provide a natural battleground for class struggle and proletarian class struggle.

Now let me summarize.

The conflict of the two struggles shows its effects in limited or extreme ways, and this is also true in other subordinate forms of class struggle.

The consistency of (coercive) state machines is guaranteed by the unification of the ruling class's political struggle policies; while the consistency of different ideological state machines usually relies on the ruling ideology, i.e., the ideology of the ruling class.

Only by considering these characteristics can we pose the following questions: What is the scope of the functions of ideological state machines? On what basis can we say they are important? In other words, if these ideological state machines do not operate through coercion but through ideology, what do their functions correspond to?

The task of coercive state machines, in essence, lies in using force (personal injury or other means) to guarantee the political conditions for the reproduction of production relations (which ultimately is the relationship of exploitation). The state machines not only spare no effort for their own reproduction (capitalist states include political ruling groups, military ruling groups, etc.), but more importantly, they also use coercive means (from the most brutal personal violence, pure administrative orders and prohibitions, to open and covert censorship) to guarantee the political conditions for the operation of ideological state machines.

In fact, in a special sense, it is precisely the ideological state machines that heavily concentrate the ruling ideology (i.e., the ruling class's ideology) on the ideological state machines.

The reproduction of production relations is guaranteed by the legal-political and ideological superstructure. However, I believe the essence of the problem lies in transcending this descriptive language. Therefore, I would rather say: the reproduction of production relations is largely guaranteed by the (ruling class) exercising certain functions within the state machine (both coercive state machines and ideological state machines).

In summary, the reproduction of production relations is guaranteed by the legal-political and ideological superstructure. However, I believe the essence of the problem lies in transcending this descriptive language. Therefore, I would rather say: the reproduction of production relations is largely guaranteed by the (ruling class) exercising certain functions within the state machine (both coercive state machines and ideological state machines).

The reproduction of