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Wang Huning and J.D. Vance#

"When a society can no longer provide hope for advancement to its members, the foundation that maintains its order begins to collapse."

Nearly 40 years later, two seemingly unrelated works resonate remarkably within the contemporary global landscape: the observations of a young Chinese scholar on American society in the late 1980s, and the memoir of an elite from rural America reflecting on his upbringing. Together, they form a unique perspective for understanding the current reorganization of the global order.

Wang Huning's 1988 "America Against America" and J.D. Vance's 2016 "Hillbilly Elegy" differ vastly in their writing purposes, cultural backgrounds, and theoretical frameworks, yet both keenly capture the deep structural contradictions within American society and the Western democratic-capitalist model. These contradictions gradually emerged over the following decades, ultimately leading to the dramatic shifts in the global order we witness today.

This article attempts to explore the fundamental issues of global order through the cross-temporal dialogue of these two works: How do different societies maintain internal stability? What challenges do these maintenance mechanisms face? How will the future global order be reconstructed? In this process, we will transcend simple ideological oppositions and delve into the basic laws of human social organization and the fundamental challenges currently faced.

I. Two Insights: From Theoretical Prophecy to Personal Empirical Evidence#

Wang Huning's Observations of America: Self-Negation within the System

In 1988, Wang Huning, then a political science professor at Fudan University, published his observational notes "America Against America" during his study visit to the United States. The core insight of this book is that the most powerful critical force in American society comes from within itself. Wang keenly observed that there exists systematic internal tension within the American democratic system:

1. The contradiction between democratic form and elite substance: The apparent democratic participation masks actual elite dominance.

2. The gap between the declaration of freedom and social inequality: The freedom emphasized in America starkly contrasts with the racial and class disparities in reality.

3. The disconnection between value promotion and behavioral practice: The values exported by America are inconsistent with its domestic and foreign policy performances.

Wang believes that these contradictions are not accidental but are inherent products of American social structure. More importantly, he points out that the critical voices and self-correcting mechanisms within American society constitute the source of vitality for the system— the phenomenon of "America Against America" is both the internal tension of the American system and its self-renewal drive.

Vance's Witness of America: The Disillusionment of the American Dream

Nearly 30 years later, in 2016, J.D. Vance, a Yale Law School graduate who had worked in Silicon Valley, published his memoir "Hillbilly Elegy," documenting his upbringing in the Appalachian regions of Ohio and Kentucky. This book provides firsthand descriptions of the lives of the working class in America's "Rust Belt":

1. Economic decline and loss of hope: The deindustrialization impact faced by traditional industrial communities.

2. The disappearance of social mobility: Opportunities for crossing class boundaries are becoming increasingly scarce.

3. Cultural disconnection and identity crisis: The vast gap between elite culture and working-class culture.

4. The spread of social pathology: Drug abuse, family disintegration, and loss of community cohesion.

Vance's narrative is not only a personal story but also a testimony to the structural problems in American society. He describes a world where dreams have been shattered, and the promise that once supported the cohesion of American society—that "everyone has the opportunity to better their condition"—has failed.

From Theory to Reality: The Realization of Prophecy

When we read these two works side by side, a striking continuity emerges: the structural contradictions Wang observed in the 1980s are concretely validated in Vance's personal experiences. The internal tension of "America Against America" that Wang foresaw ultimately erupted in the form of political upheaval during the 2016 U.S. election, while Vance's experiences provide a key insight for understanding this upheaval.

Moreover, it is significant that in 2024, Vance transitioned from a critic to the Vice President of the United States, a shift that itself validates Wang Huning's observation of the American system's capacity to absorb criticism—however, whether this absorption can truly resolve the fundamental contradictions remains to be seen.

II. The Matrix of Group Order: A Comparison of Two Maintenance Models#

To understand the significance of Wang Huning and Vance's observations for the current global order, we need to delve deeper into how different societies construct and maintain their internal stability.

The American Model: Dual Support of Expectations and Markets

The maintenance of social order in American society primarily relies on two key mechanisms:

1. A rational consensus institutional framework: Institutional arrangements such as democratic elections, separation of powers, and rule of law.

2. The expectation that "everyone can improve themselves": The emotional drive of the "American Dream" promise.

The brilliance of this structure lies in its ability to transform the inherent competition and conflict energy within human society into market behavior, channeling the primitive "poor couples lamenting" (the violent tendencies under survival competition) into economic competition through institutionalized means. Individual ambitions and desires are transformed into the driving force of the market economy, satisfying individual expectations for improvement while providing stability for the overall order.

As Tocqueville long observed, Americans' pursuit of material prosperity serves as a safety valve for maintaining social stability. Under this mechanism, groups with different values, religious beliefs, and cultural backgrounds can find cohesion in their shared pursuit of a "better life."

The Chinese Model: Integration of Control and Identity#

In contrast, the maintenance of social order in China relies on a different set of mechanisms:

1. Systematic manipulation of group behavior: Guiding social behavior through various institutional and organizational forms.

2. Construction of ideological legitimacy: From the traditional "family and country" narrative to the modern "party and country" narrative.

This model emphasizes the balance between collective identity and social control, placing individuals within a larger collective narrative that gives them meaning. Although this model appears to be fundamentally different from the American model on the surface, its core function is similar: to channel the conflict energy within society into controllable avenues, preventing it from undermining the overall order.

It is noteworthy that post-reform and opening-up, China has largely introduced the economic expectation of "everyone can improve themselves" as a supplementary stability mechanism, evolving from "letting some people get rich first" to the vision of "common prosperity." This mixed stability mechanism is an important feature of the recent evolution of the Chinese model.

The Internal Challenges of Both Models

Regardless of the model, both face inherent structural challenges:

For the American model:
• The inherent logic of capitalism inevitably leads to wealth concentration rather than equitable distribution.
• The inevitability of economic cycles means that "expectations for improvement" will periodically fail.
• Globalization, while extending cycles, also exacerbates domestic inequality.

For the Chinese model:
• The tension between individual awakening brought about by economic development and traditional control mechanisms.
• The legitimacy narrative requires continuous economic achievements for support.
• The costs and complexities of control have significantly increased in the information age.

III. The Illusion and Disillusionment of Globalization: Catalysts for Order Reorganization#

The peak of globalization from the 1990s to the 2008 financial crisis created a unique historical condition that temporarily masked the inherent contradictions within the two models mentioned above. This period was characterized by:
The "win-win" illusion of globalization.

On the surface, globalization created a "win-win" situation between the U.S. and China:

• The U.S. gained high-end returns from the global value chain through financial hegemony and consumer markets.
• China achieved rapid economic growth through manufacturing exports and technology imports.
• The expansion of global trade temporarily alleviated distribution pressures within the system.

This relationship has been described by many observers as "Chimerica," where the economies of the two countries are deeply integrated and interdependent. However, this apparent harmony concealed deeper structural tensions:

The Structural Contradictions of Globalization

1. Class differentiation within the U.S.: The globalization dividends have been distributed extremely unevenly within the U.S., with financial and tech elites benefiting the most, while manufacturing workers lose jobs and social status.

2. The delay and accumulation of periodic penalties: Economic cycle adjustments have been postponed by global imbalances, but potential risks are accumulating.

3. The inherent limitations of China's development model: The export-oriented growth model faces multiple constraints from resources, environment, and international competition.

The 2008 financial crisis was the first concentrated outbreak of these contradictions. The developments following the crisis revealed the fragility of the "win-win" narrative of globalization, and U.S.-China relations began to enter a phase of reassessment.

The Breakpoints of Global Order#

The global order after the financial crisis presents three key breakpoints:

1. The uneven distribution of economic cycle penalties: The costs of the crisis are primarily borne by the lower and middle classes in the U.S., while bailout policies mainly benefit financial elites.

2. The dual bankruptcy of legitimacy narratives: The American expectation of "everyone can improve" and the Chinese promise of "stable growth" are both simultaneously challenged.

3. The dysfunction of global governance mechanisms: International institutions are unable to effectively respond to crises, and multilateralism is called into question.

These breakpoints collectively constitute the starting point for the reorganization of the global order, triggering a wave of populism in the U.S. (the Trump phenomenon) and strategic adjustments in China (the new development pattern of domestic circulation as the mainstay, with dual circulation promoting each other).

IV. Technological Acceleration and Order Challenges in the Information Age#

The inherent contradictions of globalization are amplified by a more fundamental shift: the information technology revolution. The development of digital technology not only changes economic forms but also profoundly reshapes the foundations of social organization and power structures.

The Acceleration Paradox and Systemic Breakpoints#

Modern information technology creates a fundamental paradox: it simultaneously accelerates the emergence of problems and the discovery of solutions, but there is a significant asymmetry between the two. This acceleration effect has far-reaching impacts on social systems:

1. The mismatch between decision-making cycles and problem evolution speeds: The response speed of traditional governance institutions lags far behind the emergence of problems.

2. Systemic cascading effects of small disturbances: In highly interconnected systems, local issues are more likely to trigger global crises.

3. The temporariness of solutions and new vulnerabilities: The measures taken often become the source of new problems.

Both the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic showcased this acceleration effect: crises rapidly swept across the globe, while the responses (quantitative easing, emergency powers) themselves created new systemic risks (asset inflation, governance overreach).

The Collapse of Cognitive Infrastructure

Beyond physical and economic infrastructure, society also relies on "cognitive infrastructure"—shared thinking patterns, epistemological norms, and information processing capabilities. These infrastructures are facing unprecedented challenges in the information age:

1. Information overload and attention scarcity: The vast amount of information leads to a decline in effective processing capacity.

2. Algorithmic mediation of reality perception: People's understanding of the world increasingly relies on algorithmic filtering.

3. The collapse of shared reference points: Society lacks consensus facts and authoritative sources.

4. The weaponization of narrative competition: Information becomes a tool for systemic manipulation.

The profound impact of this challenge has been captured by Wang Huning and Vance from different angles: Wang noted the complex relationship between American media and reality; Vance described the disconnection between information and identity in his community. The rapid changes in the contemporary information environment further amplify these observations.

The Multi-layered Transformation of Power and Control

In the information age, power and control mechanisms are undergoing profound transformations, shifting from physical coercion to cognitive guidance. Notably, the two seemingly opposing social models exhibit a certain convergence in this transformation:

• In the American model: Violence does not disappear but transforms into forms of market competition and economic coercion.

• In the Chinese model: Control is not static but gradually shifts from physical coercion to information management and cognitive guidance.

This transformation indicates that superficially distinct social systems may be closer in their underlying operational mechanisms than imagined—both are attempting to address the fundamental challenges of the information age.

V. The Trust Deficit: The Core of the Meta-Crisis#

Behind specific policy conflicts, a more fundamental crisis is forming: the widespread erosion of multi-layered trust. This is not just a symptom but may be the core driving force behind systemic transformation.

Trust as Social Energy#

Trust plays a role in social systems similar to energy: it lowers transaction costs, promotes cooperation, and allows for a longer-term perspective. The widespread erosion of trust represents a process akin to entropy increase within social systems, ultimately leading to the degradation of system functions.

Wang Huning's critique of America and Vance's memoir document the process of trust failure from different perspectives:

• The collapse of trust between classes.
• The rupture of trust between regions.
• The crisis of trust between generations.

Similarly, China's strengthened control mechanisms reflect a recognition: mere economic development has not generated sufficient trust reserves to support systemic transformation.

The Breakdown of Global Trust Networks#

At the international level, the erosion of trust is even more pronounced:
• The declining authority of multilateral institutions.
• The reliability of international agreements is called into question.
• The failure of global public goods supply mechanisms.

This breakdown of global trust networks is key to understanding the current trend of fragmentation in the international system. From security dilemmas to trade frictions, from technological decoupling to supply chain restructuring, these all reflect a deep-seated trust deficit.

The Fundamental Challenge of Rebuilding Trust

Any sustainable new global order must address the core issue of trust rebuilding. This requires not only new economic or security arrangements but also a response to the fundamental challenges posed by changes in the information environment to trust mechanisms:

1. Mechanisms for verifying information authenticity: How to validate information in an era of information overload.

2. Cross-cultural and cross-ideological understanding: How to establish a minimum consensus in a world of diverse values.

3. Balancing short-term games under long-term cooperation: How to coordinate short-term interests with long-term stability.

VI. Possible Paths for Future Global Order#

Based on the above analysis, we can outline several possible paths for the reorganization of the global order:

Blockization and Order Differentiation

The global economy is likely to accelerate its differentiation into several relatively independent but still interconnected regional systems:

• The U.S.-led North America-Europe-Japan-South Korea bloc.
• The China-influenced Asia-Pacific-Africa-part of Asia bloc.
• The Russia-Central Asia-part of the Middle East bloc.

This differentiation will lead to supply chain restructuring and trade flow reconfiguration. It is important to emphasize that this is not a simple "Cold War 2.0," but a more complex networked layered order, with varying degrees of differentiation across different functional areas.

Technological Sovereignty and Digital Divisions#

Major powers will strengthen control over key technologies, and the digital economy will form "multiple standards":

• The struggle for data sovereignty and technological standards will become a new frontier.
• The internet may further differentiate into regional networks with different governance models.
• The development paths of cutting-edge technologies like AI will exhibit diversification.

Internal Order Reconstruction and Stability Mechanism Transformation

Both the U.S. and China face significant adjustments to their internal orders:#

The U.S. needs to rebuild the "expectations for improvement" that support social stability without abandoning the basic framework of capitalism:
• A return to industrial policy, emphasizing the revitalization of manufacturing.
• The introduction of limited welfare state elements.
• Symbolic accountability for the elite class.

China needs to find a balance between individual awakening brought about by economic development and traditional control mechanisms:
• Governance modernization empowered by technology.
• The narrative of national rejuvenation as a source of cohesion.
• A balance between limited economic freedom and political stability.

The Arrival of the Hybrid Order Era

We may be entering an era of "hybrid order," where different regions and cultures will develop governance methods that integrate elements of different models. This hybridization is not a simple East-West compromise but a mechanismic innovation addressing specific issues:

• The U.S. may partially restore certain elements of collectivism and national strategic planning.
• China may continue to explore how to accommodate more market mechanisms while maintaining political stability.
• Global governance will increasingly rely on functional alliances oriented toward specific issues.

VII. Meta-Adaptation: The Core of Future Competition#

In this reorganization of the global order, the most fundamental competition is not an ideological struggle but a competition of meta-adaptive capacity—the ability of societies to change their adaptation processes.

The Difference Between Traditional Adaptation and Meta-Adaptation

Traditional governance adapts through relatively slow trial-and-error cycles. Now, societies need to develop meta-adaptive capacities:

1. Proactive adaptation: Adjusting proactively before crises force change.

2. Multi-level coordination: Coordinating local experiments with systemic stability.

3. Continuity of identity during transformation: Maintaining cohesion amid deep structural changes.

Three Paths of Meta-Adaptation

Different societies are attempting different paths of meta-adaptation:

1. Top-down systemic adjustments: The Chinese model attempts systemic reforms coordinated by the central government.

2. Decentralized trial-and-error and absorption integration: The American model through local experiments and subsequent integration.

3. Hybrid networked governance: Emerging multi-centered collaborative models.

Future competitive advantages will belong to those societies that can achieve the most effective self-adjustment while maintaining social continuity—neither falling into rigidity nor losing cohesion.

VIII. Conclusion: A New Perspective Beyond Binary Opposition#

The profound insights of Wang Huning and J.D. Vance remain relevant today precisely because they transcend simple ideological binaries and touch upon fundamental issues of human social organization: How to maintain a balance between social stability and vitality in a rapidly changing environment? How to coordinate the relationship between individual freedom and collective order?

The current reorganization of the global order is essentially a collective exploration of humanity adapting to the digital age. In this process, the simple framework of the American model vs. the Chinese model is no longer sufficient to grasp the complex reality. More meaningful is the understanding of:

1. The diverse paths of governance innovation: Different societies are exploring effective governance in the digital age through various means.

2. The emergence of hybrid mechanisms: New combinations of different coordination mechanisms such as markets, networks, and hierarchies.

3. The reconstruction of cognitive infrastructure: Social perception and decision-making systems adapting to changes in the information environment.

In this sense, Wang Huning's observations of American society and Vance's descriptions of rural America are not only records of specific times and places but also different portrayals of the challenges humanity faces together. They point to a more fundamental question: In an era where technological changes reshape human relationships, what will be the source of social cohesion?

Perhaps the most successful forms of social organization in the future will neither fully adhere to the American model nor simply replicate the Chinese path, but will be able to integrate different traditional advantages, creating a new type of social contract that adapts to the digital age—a social arrangement that simultaneously meets humanity's multiple needs for security, freedom, meaning, and connection.

In this exploratory process, we need to transcend ideological biases and learn from the experiences and lessons of different social experiments with an open mind, collectively addressing the common challenges humanity faces. After all, whether East or West, we are all sailing on the same boat toward the unknown waters of digital civilization.

History will not end with a certain eternal institutional arrangement but will continue to unfold in humanity's collective exploration of adapting to changing environments.#