Philosophy of Death at Yale University, USA

Yale University Open Course: Death

The book has a total of 16 chapters, while the open course consists of 26 lectures. The course videos are available on Yale's official website and YouTube, with Chinese subtitles on NetEase Open Course. The main content of the book and the course includes the following sections:

Debates on the existence of the soul
Debates on the immortality of the soul
The nature of death
The pain of death
The value of life
Living in the face of death
The rationality and morality of suicide
What does Yale University's philosophy course on death discuss?

This course discusses death from a philosophical perspective. Below, I will briefly summarize several main discussion points.

Do we have souls?
Currently, the most widely accepted view on death is that we have souls. In other words, we are not just physical beings; we are not merely flesh and bones. Instead, we have a part of us, perhaps that core part, which is something not just physical; it is our spiritual, non-material aspect. Shelly Kagan refers to it as the soul. Most people believe in the existence of a soul, and most Americans believe in some form of non-material soul. This common view suggests that because of the existence of this non-material soul, it is very likely that we continue to exist after death. Death is the end of our physical body, but our soul is non-material, so it will continue to exist after we die. Whether or not you believe in a soul, you might at least hope that a soul exists, because that way, you are more likely to continue living in another form after death.

Through rational deduction and argumentation, Shelly Kagan does not provide a definitive answer. Whether we have souls requires the most reliable explanation, but current theories have failed to provide evidence, so he neither fully denies nor agrees with the existence of souls.

Why is death bad?
We avoid this topic because we fear death; we all think death is bad! If only we would not die.

If there is a soul, at least there is a possibility of immortality. We do not have to face death with fear and despair. But why is death bad? When considering this question, we assume that humans do not have souls, and the death of the body is the focus of a person's existence. Therefore, once I die, I no longer exist; why is non-existence bad for me?

When considering this question, it is important to clarify what we are asking. We are not asking whether the process of dying is harmful or how it is harmful. The process of dying may be painful, or it may be completely painless. Without considering this process, why is pure non-existence bad? The common view is that life is beautiful, and if death means losing life, then we lose the beautiful things in life. It seems that some of our own experiences are being taken away, which explains why death is bad.

As the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus said: "Death is the most terrible disease for us; it is of no use to us because as long as we exist, death will not be with us. But when death comes, we no longer exist. Then, it cares neither for the dead nor for the living."

Furthermore, humanity's fear of death stems from the uncontrollability of time; no one knows when death will come—perhaps decades from now, perhaps just hours away. Shelly Kagan believes that the uncontrollability of time is not necessarily a bad thing. He gives an example: Suppose on Monday I shoot John, and he slowly bleeds to death until Wednesday. Meanwhile, on Tuesday, I die of a heart attack. I killed John, but when did I do it?

Like this example of murder, facts may become outdated. When death arrives, it may have drawbacks, but after death, we no longer exist, so the drawbacks of death seem to vanish. Are the drawbacks of death present before a person dies, at the moment of death, or after death?

Suppose someone lives a long life, reaching 90 years old, and everyone thinks it is reasonable for him to die. But how do we know he could not have lived to 120? If he dies at 90, can we say that death has no drawbacks for him? Imagine if he only lived to 50. Then, has he lost the 40 years he could have had? We can say that death is a drawback for him, depriving him of those 40 years. However, he is already dead and no longer exists; do the drawbacks also cease to exist?

Immortality
We know that death is the end of life, and everyone hopes to extend their time as much as possible. Wouldn't it be best to achieve immortality? Shelly Kagan's view is that immortality does not mean one does not age. Over time, a person’s various organs deteriorate, and one cannot live the same life as when they were young; they may even need medication to sustain life. In such cases, the life you lead is not the life you hoped for. Moreover, even if one could achieve immortality, it may not be a good thing. If time were to stand still, there would be no concept of time, as if one were stuck in a loop, without hope or expectation. The meaning of one day and one hundred days, one year and one hundred years would all be lost.

Finally, Shelly Kagan also discusses the rationality of suicide. Modern psychological research shows that suicidal behavior is often closely related to mental health issues, but there are also views that suggest suicide may be a rational choice for individuals facing extreme suffering. According to ethical studies, the morality of suicide often depends on the individual's circumstances and mental state. Giving up life easily is morally controversial, but in some cases, individuals may believe that suicide is the only way to end their suffering. Therefore, understanding the complexity of suicide and the context of individual choices is crucial. Related studies include:

Joiner, TE (2005). "Why People Die by Suicide." Harvard University Press.
Van Orden, KA et al. (2010). "The Interpersonal Theory of Suicide." Psychological Review.
The final conclusion of this course is that death is "the limitation of life," a reference point for the value of life; only by understanding death can the preciousness of life be highlighted. Facing death and contemplating death is to contemplate life. For more information on studying in the U.S., please continue to follow us.

In 2024, I wrote many articles about humanity's ultimate concerns (death, freedom, loneliness, meaninglessness), and this series will continue to delve deeper in 2025. Since I have only one chance at life, these ultimate questions concerning humanity are what I must face apart from existence.
My first exposure to topics related to ultimate concerns came from the online open course "Philosophy - Death" from Yale University. I remember it was launched on NetEase Cloud Classroom, and a series of open courses from prestigious universities attracted a lot of attention. I have also briefly looked at some of the game theory and positive psychology courses. What impressed me the most was this course on death, and I really liked Shelly Kagan's teaching style, which uses rational logic to continuously delve into philosophical issues. Last month, I revisited this course and watched it in full again; the following course notes serve as a tribute to Professor Kagan.

First Lecture: Course Introduction
Western education places great emphasis on logical training, which is something that Chinese education lacks. I felt this when I was watching this course; Shelly said in class that his teaching method is to persuade students by presenting a viewpoint and providing a complete argumentation process. These argumentative processes occupy the vast majority of the course time, and at times I felt it was almost a logic class. But this is precisely the characteristic of Western philosophy, which continuously delves into the essence of things through questioning, hypothesizing, proving, and providing examples, proposing a viewpoint and refuting it, then proposing a new viewpoint and refuting it again until the best explanation is found.

Second Lecture: The Essence of Humanity: Dualism and Physicalism

The first half of the course discusses the topic of death from a metaphysical perspective.
In our understanding of death, we need to answer two key questions: ① What is the essence of a person? ② How do we understand the continuity of individual identity?
What is the essence of a person?
a) A common viewpoint is that a person is composed of body and soul. We call this the dualism viewpoint.
b) Another viewpoint is that a person is just a body. We call this the monism viewpoint.
c) For dualism, death can be understood as the process of the soul losing its connection with the body. Furthermore, I am not a combination of soul and body; I am just a soul, because that is how I can survive the death of the body.
d) For monism, the body, or entity, is different from other entities. Chalk is an entity, but a phone, as an entity, can do more interesting things than chalk. A person, as an entity, can be said to be the most miraculous entity capable of doing more interesting things.

Third Lecture: Arguments for the Existence of the Soul (I)
4. In the physicalism monism viewpoint, the mind is to the body what laughter is to the body; it is a function of the body. In this sense, death can be said to be the end of a series of functions of the body, and the body can no longer function normally.
5. "Best Explanation Argument": We usually choose the theory that best explains phenomena for things we cannot directly perceive through our five senses. So, is there a phenomenon that supports the soul as its best explanation?
6. Human rational activities can currently be well explained by science, and more controversy mainly focuses on human emotions. Does the phenomenon of humans having emotions require the soul as its best explanation?

Fourth Lecture: Arguments for the Existence of the Soul (II), Plato's Dialogues "Phaedo"
7. Continuing from the previous topic, based on numerous descriptions in human science fiction works, we have every reason to believe that robots can also behave as if they have emotions. If we further break down the emotional aspect into behavioral and experiential levels, does the phenomenon of humans having emotional experiences require the soul as the best explanation?
8. The current state of the best explanation argument is that neither dualism nor monism can currently explain how human subjective consciousness operates, so we can tentatively say it is a draw.
9. Another highly debated point is free will; is it the key that requires the soul as the best explanation?
a) Thus, we have the following three propositions:
i. Humans possess free will
ii. Anything that follows determinism has no free will
iii. All purely physical systems follow determinism
b) Therefore, we can conclude: humans are not purely physical systems.
c) Then the question arises: are all three propositions true?

Fifth Lecture: Arguments for the Existence of the Soul (III): Free Will and Near-Death Experiences
10. Rebuttal: The clearly problematic proposition is proposition 3; determinism is not correct in the field of fundamental physics (quantum mechanics), so the above argument does not hold. Propositions 1 and 2 are also highly controversial.
11. Near-death experiences can also be explained by physicalism, mainly due to the release of endorphins under extreme stress.
12. A philosophical story: Suppose I wake up in the morning, I scan my room from a certain position, I see various things, I walk to the bathroom to brush my teeth, but I do not see myself in the mirror. I touch my head, but I feel nothing. In this fictional story, my body is gone, but I am still here, so I conclude that my mind and body are different. Descartes said that the mind and body are logically independent of each other. If I tell you A exists and B does not, then A and B are completely different things; you cannot imagine a world where the same thing both exists and does not exist.

Sixth Lecture: Arguments for the Existence of the Soul (IV): Plato (I)
13. Rebuttal to Descartes' theory—the story of the morning star and the evening star. We can imagine a world where the morning star exists but the evening star does not, but in fact, they are the same star, namely Venus.
14. The story of Venus illustrates that identity is contingent.
15. Plato believed that the mind can think of ideas, and all things in the world are partial participations in ideas. Death allows the mind to free itself from the constraints of the body and fully pursue ideas. Therefore, Plato proposed many arguments about the eternity of the soul.

Seventh Lecture: Plato (II): Arguments for the Eternity of the Soul
16. "Essence Essentialism": Ideas are eternal and non-real, therefore the soul that knows ideas is also eternal and non-real. Rebuttal: The idea that only similar things can recognize each other is incorrect; a person can recognize a cat without having to become a cat.
17. "Cycle Theory": Things are always in a cycle, so the components of our souls will continue to exist after I no longer exist. Rebuttal: It can be easily demonstrated that not all parts will be recycled; many parts exist simultaneously with me, so the eternity of the soul is incorrect.
18. "Theory of Recollection": Ideas do not exist in reality, but things in reality remind us of ideas, which may be based on the premise that we have already known the ideas themselves. Rebuttal: We can fully grasp the ideas themselves in this world without needing to know them in advance.

Eighth Lecture: Plato (III): Arguments for the Eternity of the Soul - Continued
19. "Simplicity Theory": Things that can be destroyed have "parts," while "simple" things that do not contain any parts cannot be destroyed, such as the number 3 or the concept of a circle.
a) Thus, we have the following propositions and conclusions:
i. Composite things can be destroyed
ii. Changing things are composite
iii. Immaterial things do not change
iv. Therefore, immaterial things cannot be destroyed
v. Moreover, the soul is immaterial
vi. Thus, the soul cannot be destroyed
b) Rebuttal: Immaterial things can also be destroyed, such as music; when the instrument is destroyed, the music is also destroyed. Even if immaterial means cannot be perceived, there are counterexamples, such as radio waves.
c) Finally, pushing to a more extreme situation, if immaterial means cannot be observed in any way, then radio waves cannot be counterexamples, but the new problem is that the soul is not unobservable; we observe each other's souls through the actions of others' bodies.
d) The assertion that "immaterial things cannot be destroyed" is incorrect.

Ninth Lecture: Plato (IV): Arguments for the Eternity of the Soul - Continued
20. "Fundamental Attribute Theory": The soul has a fundamental attribute; having a soul means having life, or the ability to think. Just as heat is a fundamental attribute of fire, as long as it is fire, it is hot.
a) Thus, we have the following propositions and conclusions:
i. Life is a fundamental attribute of the soul
ii. Therefore, the soul is deathless, just as fire is never cold
iii. Thus, the soul will not die and cannot be destroyed
b) Rebuttal: The problem lies in the use of the concept of "deathless" in the soul's being deathless; it has two possible meanings:
i. Deathless means you cannot find a situation where a soul exists while being dead, meaning if you find a soul, it must be alive.
ii. Deathless may also mean the soul cannot be destroyed, which is the argument Plato wants to propose, but in reality, all reasoning is based on the former meaning.
21. In summary, all arguments Plato proposed about the immortality of the soul are untenable. Therefore, we have no sufficient reason to believe that the soul exists.
22. We have examined the arguments of dualists; should we also examine physicalism? How does physicalism prove that the soul does not exist? Thus, the question becomes, "How do you prove that something does not exist?" That is, rebut all arguments that want to prove that thing exists, just as we did earlier.

Tenth Lecture: Individual Identity (I): Identity Across Time and Space and the Soul Theory
23. Regarding what the essence of a person is, we have sufficient reason to believe that the soul does not exist, and the explanations of physicalism or monism are better explanations. Next, we will turn to the second key question: individual identity. For general objects, as long as the materials or parts that constitute them do not change, we can say they persist in time and space or have identity across time and space.
24. So what is the key to a person's individual identity across time and space? How do we determine that this person and a certain person after experiencing time and space are the same person? Here, dualists might say that the key to individual identity is the persistence of the exact same soul.
a) Rebuttal: Suppose last night God took away a person's original soul and put in a new soul; then this person would wake up the next day, according to the soul theory, no longer being the original person, but he himself would be completely unaware of it. How can we be sure that such a thing has not happened? It is even possible that our souls are replaced every minute, which clearly is not a key explanation for individual identity.

Eleventh Lecture: Individual Identity (II): Body Theory and Personality Theory
25. The body theory posits that the key to individual identity is the same body, but upon careful consideration, we can say that the key is the same brain. We do not say A transplanted B's brain; we only say B transplanted A's body. Analyzing this further, we can conclude that we believe the brain is the key to individual identity because the brain preserves a person's personality, so we can fully consider personality as the key to individual identity.
26. There is a science fiction story: if your personality and body can be separated, and both are subjected to severe torture, which one would you prefer to be tortured? This question will reflect which theory you identify with.

Twelfth Lecture: Individual Identity (III): Objections to Personality Theory
27. The personality theory posits that the key to individual identity is personality. However, if two modern individuals simultaneously possess all of Napoleon's personality, we would not consider both of them to be Napoleon; we would consider neither to be Napoleon. Therefore, the personality theory also has objections.
28. To make the personality theory more reasonable, we can add a no-branching condition. That is, the personality theory can conventionally serve as the key to individual identity as long as the personality has not been divided among other people or branched out. Therefore, we can say that if a person possesses all of Napoleon's personality, then that person is Napoleon; if multiple people possess all of Napoleon's personality, then none of those people are Napoleon.
29. If we agree that the personality theory with the no-branching condition is a better explanation, then we fall into another problem: our individual identity needs to rely on external conditions (the no-branching condition) to be determined. Therefore, we cannot definitively say that today’s me and yesterday’s me are the same person because I do not know whether today, somewhere else on Earth, there is someone who simultaneously possesses all of my personality.

Thirteenth Lecture: Individual Identity (IV): Where is the Essence?
30. The body theory also requires the no-branching condition to be self-consistent. Suppose we take the left hemisphere of A's brain and transplant it to B and the right hemisphere to C; then neither of these two people is A anymore.
31. Thus, it can be seen that both the personality theory and the body theory actually require the no-branching condition. It is difficult to say which theory is more correct or key. But when we ask ourselves, "What is the meaning of living?" we will find that we hope to continue existing with our personality rather than merely continuing on the level of soul or body, because that may not have meaning for us.

To be continued...

PS: This course actually only discussed two questions over half a semester, but the entire argumentative process is truly brilliant, fully showcasing the beauty of philosophical reasoning. Although it seems that Professor Kagan did not provide clear answers to these two questions, this is not important, because the purpose of education is not to provide a standard answer but to inspire and ignite students' thinking.

Yale University Online Course "Philosophy - Death" Course Notes (Part 2)

Fourteenth Lecture: Where is the Essence? (Continued), The Nature of Death (I)

The discussion on what personal identity is key to will also affect our definition of death itself. The moment a person truly dies is it the moment when personal function stops or the moment when bodily function stops? This discussion may even relate to the beginning of our life, at what moment can we be recognized as a person.

Fifteenth Lecture: The Nature of Death (Continued): Please Believe You Will Die

For those who do not believe they will really die, there are two arguments: ① We do not believe in situations we cannot imagine, such as what the experience of a person after death is like. Therefore, we do not believe people die. ② If I try to imagine a world without me, when I describe it, I am actually still in this world. Therefore, I cannot imagine a world without me, and I do not believe people die.
Rebuttal ①: We cannot internally imagine the experience of a person after death, but we can completely imagine the situation of a person after death from an external perspective. Moreover, imagining the internal experience of a person after death is like imagining oneself as a ballpoint pen, which is meaningless because a ballpoint pen has no experience. Rebuttal ②: You can imagine a meeting without your participation; you can also imagine an empty beach. Just because you view a scene from your perspective does not mean you are actually in that scene.

Sixteenth Lecture: Dying Alone, The Harm of Death (I)

A common saying, "Everyone dies alone," is actually unreasonable and does not point to any deeper meaning of death. We can examine this statement as follows:

a) This statement implies "no one is present when everyone dies." Rebuttal: Many people have family, friends, partners, etc., present when they die.

b) This statement implies "each person experiences death alone." Rebuttal: Comrades on the battlefield often experience death together.

c) This statement implies "everyone's death is not a joint effort." Rebuttal: Couples committing suicide together or collective suicides are a form of joint death.

d) This statement implies "no one can replace another in death." Rebuttal: Many things cannot be replaced by others, such as haircuts, eating, etc.; death is no exception.

e) This statement implies "everyone feels psychological loneliness or alienation when they die." Rebuttal: Those who die in their sleep or unexpectedly do not have such psychological feelings; even if dying while awake, many may not feel lonely, such as Socrates.

f) In summary, the phrase "Everyone dies alone" is not reasonable in usage and does not point to any deeper meaning of death; it is more of a habitual expression that people use without much thought.

Death is generally considered bad and harmful. Why? If according to the viewpoint of physicalism, death is my end, the disappearance of my body and personality, and I no longer exist, then death does not actually have drawbacks for the deceased, or rather, it has no impact. Some say that the harm of death is not directed at the deceased but at the living, those who are forced to separate from the deceased due to their death. But this is not the true core of the harm of death. Suppose there are two stories:

a) Story one: Your friend is about to travel beyond the solar system, a journey that will take 100 years, and after the spaceship leaves Earth, you will lose contact forever after 20 minutes. Clearly, you will be forever separated from your friend.

b) Story two: With the same background, but the spaceship your friend is on explodes 15 minutes after takeoff, and everyone on board unfortunately dies. Clearly, you are also forever separated from your friend, but we often think the second story is worse than the first. This shows that the true core of the harm of death is not separation but something else.

Seventeenth Lecture: The Harm of Death (II): Deprivation Explanation

The deprivation theory of the harm of death: When we say something is bad or harmful, it has both absolute and relative interpretations. The harm of death is not absolutely harmful but relatively harmful, meaning death deprives me of the various beautiful things I might encounter while alive.
If the deprivation theory is indeed the core of the harm of death, then at what point does this harm occur? Regarding this question, we have the following propositions and conclusions:

a) Anything only harms you when you exist.

b) When you die, you no longer exist.

c) Therefore, death does not produce harm for you.

d) Clearly, according to previous discussions, proposition b is correct. If proposition a is also correct, then conclusion c clearly denies the deprivation theory; if proposition a is incorrect, then another problem arises: if there are things that can harm you even when you do not exist, then those countless potential people who could have been born but were not also apply to the deprivation theory, which is clearly unreasonable.

e) To resolve this contradiction, we can revise proposition a to specify two versions:

i. Loose version: Anything only harms you when you exist or have existed.

ii. Strict version: Anything only harms you when you exist at the same time.

f) The loose version of proposition a can avoid the above contradiction, allowing the deprivation theory to hold.

Eighteenth Lecture: The Harm of Death (III): Immortality (I)

Discussion on the Lucretius problem: According to the deprivation theory, we believe that the time after death is harmful; then, for the long time before a person is born, it should also be seen as a loss of the beauty of living. Why do we care more about the loss after life ends rather than the absence before life begins? There are three arguments:

a) Unlike human death, which is contingent, human birth is necessary; therefore, we cannot change the timing of birth. Rebuttal: Frozen sperm and eggs can control the timing of birth to achieve early birth.

b) People often think of early birth as merely a forward shift in lifespan, while thinking about death means extending lifespan. Rebuttal: If an asteroid were to strike Earth tomorrow, leading to human extinction, then early birth would not just be a shift in time but an extension of life.

c) Compared to the past, people are more concerned about the future; this is human nature. Rebuttal: This statement is difficult to argue as a theory; people's inherent attitudes toward the two types of time do not necessarily represent a rational attitude.

d) Conclusion: There is currently no consensus in the philosophical community regarding the Lucretius problem.

Discussion on the immortality issue: ① If we accept the deprivation theory, does that logically mean we must accept immortality? Not necessarily, because the deprivation theory's condition is that death deprives us of the beauty of living; if life no longer provides beauty, then death becomes a form of liberation. ② Is immortality necessarily a good thing? Not necessarily; many people have raised similar viewpoints that any form of life, no matter how beautiful, will become a disaster if it lasts forever. If immortality is a bad thing, then death, as the opposite of immortality, is not necessarily a good thing either; if death comes too early, it remains a bad thing.

Nineteenth Lecture: Immortality (II): The Value of Life (I)

Further expanding on the discussion of immortality, suppose we can avoid the boredom and monotony of eternal life through certain methods, such as removing the prefrontal cortex; however, this would mean I can no longer experience the complete human experience. For example, periodic amnesia might mean that after a sufficiently long time, I would no longer be the same person as I am now, which would have no meaning for the current me. Therefore, perhaps the best setting for immortality is that I can live as long as I want until life can no longer satisfy me.
The deprivation theory posits that the harm of death is that it deprives us of the beauty of living. So what constitutes a good life? Or what is the value of living? We can list many things, which can be divided into two categories: instrumental value and intrinsic value. For example, work, money, and delicious food belong to the former, while happiness belongs to the latter. Similarly, instrumental value and intrinsic value can also have negative aspects, such as unemployment and poverty belonging to the former, and suffering belonging to the latter.
Suppose happiness (the absence of suffering) is the only value of life; this is the viewpoint of "hedonism." Hedonism believes that life is about pursuing pleasure as much as possible and avoiding suffering as much as possible. Thus, we can imagine a life experience machine that can simulate all experiences in life; we can achieve as much pleasure and as little suffering as possible by setting appropriate parameters. So, would you be willing to live in this machine for the rest of your life? If your answer is negative, it indicates that hedonism is not the entirety of life's value. At the very least, living in the machine would prevent you from truly accomplishing anything.

Twentieth Lecture: The Value of Life (II): Other Harms of Death (I)

"Neutral Container Theory": Life itself has no value, akin to a neutral container; the value of life depends on the good and bad of what we put into the container. "Moderate Life Value Theory": Life itself has value, but it is not to an exaggerated extent; it can moderately offset the bad things experienced in life.
In addition to the deprivation theory, other characteristics of death are also worth discussing:

a) The inevitability of death: The inevitability of death applies to me and to everyone; clearly, there can be both good and bad aspects for both.

b) The variability of death: For individuals, dying too early is certainly a bad thing, but from the perspective of humanity as a whole, some die younger than the average lifespan while others live longer, which seems to offset each other. However, based on the human tendency to focus more on short-term losses than long-term gains, perhaps overall, it is also a bad thing.

c) The unpredictability of death: The unpredictability of death makes it difficult for us to plan our lives because we have more inclined life trajectories.

Twenty-first Lecture: Other Harms of Death (II)

Continuing the previous discussion:

d) The universality of death: Death can occur at any time and in any place; we must always be on edge and cautious because there is no time, place, or activity that can exempt us from death. In this regard, we can also think about the value of life, which activities would you still participate in even if there is a risk of death?

How we should face death requires appropriate timing and context. We should always keep in mind that we will eventually die, and it may not be appropriate to think about our eventual death all the time.

Twenty-second Lecture: Fear of Death

Fear is the most common emotion we experience when facing death. When we discuss fear, we need to consider three conditions:

a) The object of fear is a bad thing.

b) There is a non-negligible possibility of this bad thing occurring.

c) This bad thing also needs to have sufficient uncertainty (this point may be controversial); when we know that a bad thing will definitely happen and also know how bad it is, feeling fear is not an appropriate emotion.

d) Based on the above conditions, we do not need to fear death itself because death is certain, and the deprivation of life's beauty due to death is not something to be feared. What we fear more is dying too early because of the unpredictability of death.

A terminal prayer expresses the emotion we should have when facing death (I really like this prayer):

God made mud. God got lonesome.

So God said to some of the mud, “Sit up.”

“See all I’ve made.” Said God.

“The hills, the sea, the sky, the stars.”

And I, with some of the mud, had got to sit up and look around.

Lucky me, lucky mud.

I, mud, sat up and saw what a nice job God had done.

Nice going God! Nobody but you could have done it God!

I certainly couldn’t have. I feel very unimportant compared to You.

The only way I can feel the least bit important is to think of all the mud that didn’t even get to sit up and look around.

I got so much, and most mud got so little.

Thank you for the honor!

Now mud lies down again and goes to sleep.

What memories for mud to have! What interesting other kinds of sitting-up mud I met!

I loved everything I saw.

We should not fear death; we should be grateful for the opportunity to experience the beauty of life.

Twenty-third Lecture: How to Face Death

The value of life is not merely the product of the quality of life and the length of life; people often focus more on the peak quality of life, while the length of life is a secondary consideration.
Regarding how to face death, there are three different thoughts:

a) A part of me will continue after I die, such as my genes being passed on to my children, or the atoms that make up my body transforming into other substances and continuing to exist.

b) The achievements I have made will continue after I die, such as literary creations, scientific research, philosophical viewpoints, or even buildings I helped construct.

c) The first two ideas are somewhat self-deceptive; comparatively, the second may be more acceptable to more people, but both ideas are based on the premise that life is beautiful, so we believe death is a bad thing while we try to enrich our lives as much as possible. The third idea posits that life is inherently suffering; especially from the Buddhist perspective, death is not a bad thing but rather a liberation.

Twenty-fourth Lecture: Suicide (I): The Rationality of Suicide

Whether one believes in the "neutral container theory" or the "moderate value theory," when the overall value of life becomes negative, suicide indeed becomes a rational choice at that point. However, due to unpredictability, we often become blind to this, so suicide is usually not a rational choice, especially when you are still young.

Twenty-fifth & Twenty-sixth Lectures: Suicide (II & III): Moral Judgments of Suicide and Course Conclusion

Regarding the moral judgment of suicide, there are the following statements:

a) According to utilitarianism, suicide is a neutral act, and its morality depends on whether the outcome of the suicide is good or bad.

b) Deontological ethics argues that when judging morality, one cannot only consider the outcome; there are other moral standards. Killing an innocent person is immoral. However, suicide and killing an innocent person are still different; suicide involves the principle of consent, as it is a decision made with my own consent. Therefore, deontological ethics also seems to be a neutral statement, depending on whether the person considering suicide has rationally evaluated their situation and made a decision to end their own life.

Summary: The two parts together amount to over 8000 words. Thank you to those who read to the end. I have tried to record all the viewpoints and corresponding rebuttals and arguments presented by Professor Kagan in this course using concise language. I hope to help myself and more people think better about the ultimate concern of death, as this is how we can better appreciate our one and only life. I would like to summarize the entire course in three sentences:

1. The soul does not exist; humans are merely miraculous physical entities, and when the entity breaks down, everything comes to an end.

2. Death deprives us of the beauty of living, thus is a bad thing for most people, but this does not mean that immortality is a good thing; on the contrary, immortality would only make things worse.

3. In the face of death, we do not need to fear; we should be grateful for the opportunity to experience the beauty of life, but if life is no longer worth living under any circumstances, then that is the moment we should let go.

Finally, I hope everyone can understand the truth about life and death and no longer have fear and delusions when facing death.

References:

Epicurus Quotes – Goodreads
Joiner, TE (2005). "Why People Die by Suicide." Harvard University Press.
Van Orden, KA et al. (2010). "The Interpersonal Theory of Suicide." Psychological Review.
Commonly Asked Questions:

Question 1: When was Yale's death course established?
Yale's death course was established by Professor Shelly Kagan in January 2007. This philosophy course explores the meaning of death and humanity's views on death, becoming one of the most popular open courses globally.

Question 2: How many views does this course have?

As of November 2024, Yale's death course has received over 70 million views on YouTube. This number reflects the course's widespread influence and popularity.

Question 3: What are the main discussion topics of this course?

The course primarily discusses several philosophical themes, including debates on the existence of the soul, the nature of death, the value of life, and the rationality and morality of suicide. These topics provoke deep reflection among participants regarding life and death.

Question 4: Why has the topic of death become more important during the COVID-19 pandemic?
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the concept of death became more relevant to everyone's lives. The pandemic forced people to confront the reality of life and death, leading many to reflect more on the meaning of life and the inevitability of death, thus prompting discussions and reflections on this topic.

Question 5: What core viewpoints did Professor Shelly Kagan convey in this course?
Professor Shelly Kagan believes that death is the "limitation of life," an important reference for understanding the preciousness of life. By confronting and contemplating death, individuals can gain a deeper understanding of the meaning of life and cherish every moment in life.

The director of Yale University's online open course program once said: "I know Chinese students refer to Professor Kagan as 'the great master'; they appreciate his death course because it is a non-traditional teaching style."

Professor Kagan does not resemble the gloomy old philosopher stereotype at all; he has a full beard and appears carefree. In a world-renowned institution like Yale, Kagan faces hundreds of students not in a suit but in jeans and canvas shoes. Even more exaggerated, he sometimes sits cross-legged on the podium, sometimes lets his legs dangle over the edge of the podium, and often gestures animatedly while discussing the essence of life and death, appearing relaxed and stylish.

Kagan was born in Skokie, Illinois, and received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Wesleyan University in 1976. He earned his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1982. He then taught at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Illinois at Chicago before coming to Yale University in 1995. Kagan's research focuses on moral philosophy, especially normative ethics.

As for why he established an open course on death, Kagan said: "In my view, everyone cannot avoid thinking about the topic of 'death.' Many people try not to think about it, but that is actually impossible. The reason I created this open course is also to hope that my students can think openly and directly about all aspects of the topic of 'death.' Some people think this topic is distressing, but more people find it an attractive topic."

After the course was launched, Kagan would often be asked, "How do you personally understand death?" Kagan always answers candidly: "I have discussed many different aspects of 'death' in the course, so I find it difficult to summarize a conclusion appropriately. Personally, I can simply summarize my understanding of 'death' as follows: there is no non-material, immortal soul; we are just bodies, and when our bodies die, it means our existence comes to an end. Some people believe in an immortal existence and may be unwilling to accept my understanding, but I believe immortality is not worth pursuing. Of course, life is beautiful, and we do not want to easily accept death because it means our right to possess or pursue beautiful things is deprived."

The wisdom of existing in the world

A few years ago, there was a special student in Kagan's death course. He was diagnosed with cancer in his freshman year but was determined to complete his studies in the remaining years. In the second semester of his senior year, he enrolled in the death open course. Kagan said: "Knowing that someone in his situation decided to take this course made me feel ashamed. The teachers who taught him had to face a question: what kind of grade should we give him?" In the end, that student did not finish Kagan's deconstruction of death and was hospitalized. Before his death, Yale University awarded him a bachelor's degree.

Kagan said that regarding death, there have long been two viewpoints that exist in almost everyone's subconscious. One is that we all acknowledge that our bodies will eventually stop functioning, but we actually do not believe we will die. In Tolstoy's classic novel "The Death of Ivan Ilyich," Ilyich falls and his condition worsens until he eventually dies. Surprisingly, Ilyich is greatly shocked when he realizes he will die. Tolstoy wants to convey through this story that most of us are like Ilyich; we verbally acknowledge that we will die, but to some extent, we do not truly believe it. Kagan said: "This is indeed puzzling; how can a person simultaneously believe and not believe that they will eventually die?"

The second viewpoint about death is the fear of "dying alone." Kagan said: "The saying that we die alone seems to be true; no one can replace me in experiencing my death, but this is not a profound insight into the nature of death." Similarly, no one can replace you in getting a haircut, exercising, or having lunch because fearing death due to the fear of dying alone is purely "nonsense."

Kagan said that the correct emotional response to death is not fear or anger but gratitude for the opportunity to have life.

A student who watched Kagan's open course online said: Kagan, sitting cross-legged at the podium, discusses the final destination with us like an ancient sage. Eternity, soul, body... Kagan uses these keywords to help us construct not only a powerful knowledge system but also a wisdom for living in the world.

Philosophical Notes Part One (A Bit Late)

As a philosophical novice, I can only offer my shallow opinions, discussing my disagreements and thoughts on what the teacher has said; if I agree with the teacher, I will not reiterate it.

First Lecture

No objections. However, I personally believe that many comments fall into the dualism vs. materialism dichotomy, just as the comments suggest. Perhaps people have brought their aversion to religion into the course, or they still believe that we should consider the discussion objectively, treating them as two philosophical viewpoints with equal competitive opportunities without too much personal involvement. Moreover, even if one brings their aversion to religion into it, there is no need to belittle dualism; the professor has repeatedly emphasized that dualism does not imply that the soul can achieve immortality, and it may even result in the same outcome as monism, so let’s remain calm and objective.

Second Lecture

One explanation for dualism regarding robots being able to have purpose and logic could be that robots at that time also possess a soul. However, the professor also mentioned that all the mechanisms of robots are known to humans and have been proven to be material, so this argument should also be untenable. Therefore, this question transforms into whether the purposes of robots are free or emotional; must free will and emotion require a soul to explain? I look forward to the next lecture.

Third Lecture

Ultimately, the contradiction lies in the fact that the current science has not provided a definitive answer on how emotions (and many other "sensory" qualia, collectively referred to as consciousness) arise, leaving much ambiguity to exploit. In summary, there are two major factions regarding how consciousness arises: one side is physicalism, which posits that consciousness arises from purely physical means, while the other side is dualism, which posits that consciousness can only exist due to the existence of a non-physical, elusive so-called soul.

The professor provided an argument: "We cannot explain yet" is different from "We will never be able to explain." Therefore, although physicalism currently cannot explain consciousness based on scientific discoveries, it does not mean it will never be able to explain it. Thus, we cannot say that dualism should be believed simply because it can better explain consciousness, as monism also has that potential (monism = physicalism).

However, the distinction between "we cannot explain yet" and "we will never be able to explain" can only be seen retrospectively. Let’s discuss the analogy provided by the professor: In the 14th century, people attempting to explain what life is could reasonably conclude that life is driven by "some non-material energy" based on the scientific knowledge available to them at that time, as they had not yet researched DNA and cellular atoms, confirming that "ordinary" life indeed operates like a machine. This is an example of "we cannot explain yet, but we will be able to explain in the future." But how did those people know which scientific blind spots would eventually provide explanations and which would not? For them, the two were the same. The same applies to our current era: we cannot know whether physicalism will make progress in explaining consciousness in the future, nor can we assume it will, as it is possible that physicalism may simply be unable to explain this issue. We cannot use a vague, preconceived, and biased "possibility" as a rebuttal against dualism (unless new discoveries arise, but then it would no longer be vague). At this stage, I conclude that dualism explains the issue of consciousness better than physicalism, although it may only be by a slight advantage.

But I still cannot be completely convinced by dualism. First, the explanations provided by dualism are also not thorough and are quite vague; they are just slightly "less vague" than those of physicalists. Because they attribute the emergence of consciousness to an unspecified, unclear "force"—the soul—this indeed cannot fully convince anyone. (If this is the case, then in the best explanation argument, dualism would lose, right? Or did the professor not mention the potentially finer mechanisms that dualism could have? Moreover, physicalism has many other more convincing arguments; I believe that if a theory (science) can explain the vast majority of phenomena, even if some phenomena's explanations are not very convincing (such as paranormal events), it is still justified to use science to explain and believe in that explanation. Moreover, in the case of consciousness, dualism has not clearly defeated physicalism, so physicalists' inclination towards physicalism will not be interrupted by this small episode. To be honest, we can never prove consciousness can be explained by physical means through observing a robot's emotions, as we can never empathize with whether an emotional robot is truly sincere or merely superficial, as some dualist defenders claim. We will never know because we can never become robots. The study of human emotions can theoretically clarify all steps to prove that the emergence of consciousness is entirely physical, but because the human body is regarded by dualists as the carrier of the soul, it is difficult to escape the suspicion that it is indeed the soul that produces consciousness. Furthermore, even if we clarify all steps... No, actually, the steps of robots, if we keep questioning them, we also do not understand them. So, does this mean robots indeed have a soul, or am I falling into the belief that everything has a soul? Agnosticism? What on earth am I thinking...

(Does believing in physicalism mean that all phenomena arise from physical steps, or does it merely prove that humans are no different from other objects? This sameness can represent that humans and other things are both physical, and it can also represent that humans and other things both have souls... As for agnosticism, I follow Kant's interpretation; thank you, great benefactor.)

In any case, neither physicalists nor dualists have solid theories regarding consciousness. There is no definitive support for either side.

So I tend to believe that at this stage of scientific progress, neither side can be definitively supported, at least not on this argument. Both sides have theories that can hold under their respective viewpoints, so this becomes more of a reverse inference; believing in which viewpoint becomes the cause for choosing which theory of consciousness arises because, as I have emphasized, at this stage of scientific conditions, both explanations are similarly flawed (dualism theoretically has a slight edge).

Alright, onto the second part of this lecture, is creativity a creation of the soul? Is any thought truly "created"? Or is it all summarized based on personal experience and internal systems, limited by them? Is creativity free will? Is there anything in the universe that is free, or is everything deterministic? Is quantum mechanics, often used to rebut determinism, valid? These topics will continue to be exciting in the next lecture. (Thank goodness I can finally pass the buck; this has exhausted me.)

Oh, right, I also want to mention that I don't understand why some comments nitpick and criticize the professor for using outdated examples. I have seen a video where the uploader used a somewhat inappropriate example, and the comments kept fixating on the shortcomings of that example, arguing for a long time to prove that the example was inappropriate. I actually think the quality of the example does not matter; examples are not formal analogies, especially when you can easily come up with a better example to support a viewpoint. The quality of the example does not really affect the argument. The role of an example is to aid understanding; as long as the example does not deviate drastically from the facts opposing a viewpoint, merely being inappropriate does not prove that viewpoint is incorrect. A poor example may simply mean that the context does not align with the argument; as long as it does not lead to misunderstanding, I believe it is unnecessary to nitpick.

Fourth Lecture

The probabilities in quantum mechanics and macro-level free will cannot be equated. The random decay of an atom is not because we instruct it to decay or not decay; it is an uncontrollable probability. I personally believe that the logic of determinism does not equal randomness, nor does it equal free will. Humans, on a macro level, still follow the deterministic laws of physics. Free will is merely an illusion. But since neither humans nor other things have (or do) free will, then the soul cannot be the optimal solution for the erroneous conclusion that humans differ from other things.

Let's talk about near-death experiences and the other theories mentioned by the professor that can theoretically be used to argue for the existence of the soul. Similarly, I believe that physicalism and dualism are at a stalemate; both can explain these events using their own logic, depending on which side you believe. I do not think that one explanation of paranormal events is so superior that you can believe in one side based solely on that; rather, you view this issue through the filter of the side you believe is the best explanation for other issues.

In summary, simply attributing everything to the soul in dualism (excluding near-death experiences, as the existence of consciousness after death is sufficient to prove the existence of the soul without needing logical details, so it can stand on equal footing with physicalism) and the well-evidenced, multi-dimensional physicalism, when both explain a phenomenon, physicalism will always have the advantage. In terms of movement, physicalism is a better explanation than dualism; in terms of near-death experiences, both sides are equal; in terms of sensation, dualism currently has the upper hand. The reason for believing in one stance can be through a series of small "victories" convincing you or being convinced by a crushing advantage, and the arguments listed below may become that "crushing advantage," namely Descartes' thought experiment.

Since the mind and body can be thought of separately, does that not confirm the existence of the soul? I summarized several possible rebuttals from physicalists based on comments and my own thoughts: How can a non-material thing be proven to exist using the thinking patterns of material reality? (This is debatable.) Does this merely describe the mind before forming bodily memory? (This is debatable.) And consciousness is a part of the body, not the entirety of the body? (I do not think so; if so, the conscious and the non-conscious parts of the body are also two distinct things, right?) (Some people also raised the question of why there is vision; here I believe vision is a part of consciousness; it is possible that without eyes, vision would cease to exist, but this does not argue whether they can be separated or not; it merely argues that they are different things that demonstrate the existence of the soul as an independent consciousness.)

Fifth Lecture

The two points worth debating above have been considered viable arguments against Descartes.

I personally disagree with the counterexample provided by the professor. The morning star and evening star can be thought of as one thing not existing while the other does because the definitions derived from different times have changed, not because the object itself is different. The inconsistency of the morning star and evening star arises from our visual senses being deceived, and it does not mean that the "morning star," which should be the same as the evening star, truly does not exist.

Of course, if that is the case, Descartes' thought experiment can also be argued; just because we cannot see the body does not mean it is not real. This raises another question about Descartes' argument: what I imagine and feel is merely logically coherent and does not represent the existence of reality. No matter how you think the soul and body are separate, there is a possibility that reality does not follow the logical results you imagine; the same logic does not mean they are identical. Therefore, even if the rebuttal to Descartes' counterexample has issues, Descartes' experiment itself is already riddled with holes; although it may seem convincing at first glance, it now seems that dualism has lost another supporting argument.

(Here, the real world refers to the fact that although our senses may be obscured, we can still perceive the things in this world through our senses, without involving agnosticism.)

The explanation of Platonic Forms by physicalists may be that they are gradually constructed and generalized from the imperfect accumulations of daily life into a perfect concept that can only be imagined. I personally believe that Socrates/Plato's understanding of abandoning material pursuits to obtain Platonic Ideals is more practical than logical; of course, this is just my superficial opinion as a philosophical novice. I still agree with the importance of Platonic Ideals and their rules for our understanding of the world.

Sixth Lecture

First of all, the fundamental premise of all of Plato's theories is the existence of the soul. He only has one argument in the book to attempt to support this point: we can understand the non-real and the eternal, which means that the things we use to think must also be non-real and eternal, namely the soul. I support the rebuttal provided by the professor; I personally feel it does not constitute a shift in concepts; Plato's argument is about how you must be to understand that kind of thing; it is not about empathy. If it is merely about understanding, then there are many counterexamples.

Or from another perspective, can we really understand the non-material and the eternal? I can tentatively agree that we can understand the non-material, but eternity, such a terrifyingly grand concept, I do not believe we can truly grasp. Therefore, from this point of view, even if the soul truly exists, it is not sufficient to prove that it is eternal, let alone that it has not yet successfully proven the existence of the soul.

So since the foundational premise does not work, I personally believe that discussing the eternity of the soul has even less basis. However, in light of the philosophical viewpoints and thoughts proposed by Plato, I will still record my views on each argument.

As discussed in the fifth lecture, my understanding of Platonic Ideals is that they are summarized/abstracted/extrapolated from experiences in this life without needing to involve previous lives or memories. It is a pity that ethical constraints prevent us from conducting experiments on infants to truly test this (this does not undermine the necessity of scientific ethics; it is still essential), otherwise, these issues would have been resolved.

Seventh Lecture

I personally believe that immaterial things can be changed and destroyed. I agree that Platonic Forms exist eternally and cannot be destroyed, but this does not mean that the soul, as another immaterial thing, shares the same properties as Platonic Forms. If the soul represents our thoughts, then it is clear that our thoughts change daily; how can we derive that all immaterial things are eternal from this? (So if you are a dualist, does that mean the soul has parts?)

(I personally feel that the soul is difficult to compare with Platonic Forms; Platonic Forms are lofty concepts, such as justice, beauty, and the circle. Although people's understanding of beauty may change, the concept of beauty is undoubtedly one of the Platonic Forms. But the soul is concrete; each person's soul is uniquely different, so although they are theoretically immaterial, using the properties derived from Platonic Forms to argue for the soul will encounter many issues. In other words, immaterial things have a subset of Platonic Forms, only those that possess the properties of being unchangeable and indestructible. We can define this subset as undetectable immaterial; this will be discussed later.)

Let's talk about harmony. First, I rebut Simmias' example; I do not believe the concept of harmony itself can be destroyed; it also belongs to the eternal and unchanging Platonic Forms (the video mistakenly translated harmony as music; in the following text, harmony refers to harmony, while music refers to music). However, if we replace harmony with music, this specific yet immaterial thing (each piece of music is unique; although the sound waves that make up each piece of music are physical, the melodies we hear in our minds are immaterial) can fit into the context very well and can theoretically serve as a better analogy for the soul because both are specific (specific is different from physical) and have parts (music is composed of notes, which are also immaterial parts; thus, can immaterial objects also have immaterial parts? Hence, music can also change like the soul over time, but since a piece of music does not have temporal continuity, it cannot achieve the traditional "change" of reorganization/separation of already played notes (different notes are not on the same timeline), and the so-called change to the entire music only adds new notes to the original melody over time. As for whether the soul is similar to music in this regard, since I am not a dualist, I will not delve too deeply into the specific mechanisms), and both rely on a physical medium for expression.

However, is music and the soul a good analogy? Remember that there are already two overlapping premise fallacies, so whether it is a good analogy is irrelevant to my conclusion that the soul does not exist: it has not proven that the soul exists, and even if the two are not good analogies, the counterexample that music can be destroyed is already sufficient to overturn the argument that the soul cannot be destroyed (as the professor mentioned). There was an interesting dialogue in the comments:

"I feel that these two have nothing in common; after all, the mind and body exist simultaneously, while music is produced only through the performance of instruments, which is the ability of one object."

"Then when the body's functions cease, a person can no longer think, right?" (So is the soul also the ability of the body?)

Music relies on instruments to exist; if the analogy is good, then the "soul" also relies on the body to exist? No wonder the professor said this is an early form of physicalism.

However, the professor later seemed to deny the possibility of music as a counterexample through the definition of immateriality. Although in this logic, valid counterexamples were found later, I personally believe that human senses are too limited and subjective; I do not recognize the reasonable boundaries of definitions. It is entirely possible for a civilization established by a being capable of detecting radio waves to consider radio waves as "immaterial" that can be sensed by their senses, so relying too heavily on human subjectivity is a stretch and lacks philosophical significance. The appropriate definition should be whether it can be detected (detect), and under such a definition, music and the soul, as things that can also be detected, can be counterexamples; music can indeed serve as a counterexample.

(Connecting to what was said earlier, some people, like me, would think that mathematical formulas theoretically also count as undetectable Platonic Forms, but they cannot be destroyed; this raises the question of whether they can be changed. After careful consideration, I still resolve that they will not change, as they have a directed outcome; thus, different formulas cannot be considered variations of one formula; they are all different. Moreover, the principle expressed by one formula (for example, 2+3=5) will also never change; this is similar to the so-called comparison of different independent pieces of music leading to the illusion of "change," as the only way to make a comprehensive change to a piece of music that spans time is to continue playing notes to add new parts. Therefore, some special Platonic Forms can have parts (the music mentioned earlier is not a Platonic Form), but having parts does not mean they can be changed (these parts must be changeless, but having changeless parts does not mean they can change).)

So now there are already three interconnected premise errors: it has not proven that the soul exists, immaterial things can change, and immaterial things can be destroyed. The argument has completely collapsed.

Eighth Lecture

Yes! Having no parts does not mean it cannot be destroyed!

Combining what was said earlier, let's sort it out:

Platonic Forms can have parts, but they do not change during their existence. Although in everyday logic, it is safe to boldly say they are eternal, after billions of years, when this universe, which relies on our familiar logic, perishes, they will suddenly disappear, as mentioned in the video.

Detectable things can also lack parts (notes); these parts that lack parts will not change during their existence, but their difference from Platonic Forms is that they do not have to wait until the world perishes to be destroyed; when a sound wave stops vibrating, the notes will suddenly disappear, and the soul may very well be like this, suddenly disappearing after the body dies.

The fact that something undetectable can only indicate that it is a concept imagined by thought; so can we say that everything undetectable is a Platonic Form? Counterexamples are welcome, but for now, let's assume so.

Change always implies it can be destroyed; the reverse is not necessarily true.

The soul and music are not entirely the same; analogies are merely used to aid understanding, and there is no need to forcefully align every property, such as the soul not affecting the body; I do not believe music will affect the harp, while the soul and body influence each other.