Reporting and Secret Visits at the Grassroots Level

According to the investigation, secret visits have the following seven characteristics:#

First, there are no inspection notices issued.
The county and township do not have information on whether the higher-ups will inspect or when they will inspect, so they cannot prepare like they would for a scheduled inspection. Often, the county and township only learn about the secret visit after it has been reported.
Second, the inspection team consists of few members.
Unlike the large inspection teams with dozens of people, secret visit teams typically have three to five members, with some having only two. They are mainly young people who dress fashionably, looking less like officials and more like tourists visiting relatives, making it difficult for villagers and rural officials to notice them.
Third, the inspection team may be a third-party organization.
Some secret visit teams are hired third-party organizations, making it difficult for the county and township to establish contact with them. Even if they know about the secret visit, it is hard to navigate relationships.
Fourth, they come with problems.
Secret visit teams differ from inspection teams. Inspection teams aim to understand facts and supervise work, and they do not necessarily have to identify problems or take problems away; many issues can be "rectified" on the spot. Secret visit teams sometimes come with clues about problems, so they must understand the problem situation and bring detailed, evidence-supported issues. Even if they do not bring problems, they must take problems away because the purpose of a secret visit is to identify issues. If no problems are taken away, the work cannot be reflected. Once a secret visit occurs, regardless of whether grassroots work is done well or poorly, there will definitely be a problem report.
Fifth, they do not interact with county and township officials.
Secret visit teams do not interact with frontline staff. The problems identified by inspectors are viewed from their perspective, not from the specific temporal and spatial context. Inspection teams need to interact with county and township officials, who can place issues in a specific context for explanation, presenting the objectivity of the problems. For example, if a secret visit team enters an old courtyard by climbing over a wall and finds a dry toilet that has not been converted to a water toilet, they report it as a problem. However, the family has not returned home for five or six years since moving to the city, and the county and township cannot change the toilet without permission; even if they did, it would not be used. But the secret visit team does not understand these objective factors, turning one aspect of the problem into the only problem. Because they cannot explain it, policies do not receive practical feedback.
Sixth, there is excessive management of problems.
Because they need to take problems away, secret visit teams focus on discovering issues, adopting a broad or self-defined perspective on problem definitions, which is excessive management. For example, during a secret visit by the discipline inspection commission, they turn the fact that grassroots staff eat breakfast in their offices, have vases on their desks, or do not have items on their desks into problems. Similarly, if there is suddenly a pile of paper scraps or chicken droppings on a clean rural street, which is an incidental phenomenon, it is photographed and taken back as a definite problem.
Seventh, problems are reported across levels.
The results of secret visits at the provincial and municipal levels are generally communicated to the county and township in the form of reports, but the problems are not directly addressed. After receiving the report, relevant main leaders at the county level must provide instructions to show their attention, while also forming investigation teams to investigate and address related issues and responsibilities.

The impact of secret visits and inspections on policy implementation and grassroots governance includes:#

First, improving daily work.
Taking the improvement of living environments as an example, to prevent unforeseen circumstances, village cadres stationed in townships must go to the countryside daily to supervise sanitation workers to perform their duties well, urging village officials to pay attention and promoting sanitation details and habits to villagers.
Second, policy rigidity.
On one hand, secret visits eliminate the ambiguous space of policies; policies need to be completed according to standards or exceed standards, and some policies that do not align with rural realities cannot be flexibly implemented. On the other hand, the lack of feedback in policy practice leads to an inability to adjust and correct policies in a timely manner.
Third, comprehensive rectification.
Unless secret visits are conducted with problem clues, most secret visits are point-based, generalizing issues. For example, if a problem arises in one township during a secret visit, it implies that similar problems exist throughout the county, necessitating rectification across the county, easily leading to a situation where "one person is sick, the whole family takes medicine."
Fourth, increasing layers of scrutiny.
In inspections, the county and township are a community of interests, collaborating to prepare for inspections. However, in secret visits, if a township has problems, it is also the county's problem and responsibility, thus requiring both the county and township to eliminate the issues together. The county and township also have a basis for collaboration. However, since problems cannot be eliminated through collusion in secret visits, the county must urge townships to do their work well before the higher-level secret visits to avoid being caught in a secret visit, leading them to conduct secret visits themselves. The requirements for higher-level secret visits are strict, and to avoid any issues, the county will be even stricter in secret visits, layering demands. Unlike past inspections where the county would check first to promote work and train for inspections, if the county identifies problems during secret visits, it will initiate punishment procedures. Because they do not know when higher-ups will conduct secret visits, the county's secret visits must become routine.
Fifth, increased penalties.
After the provincial and municipal reports on problems, the county, to show its seriousness about the issues, not only reacts quickly, provides instructions quickly, and investigates quickly but also increases penalties for lower levels, intensifying accountability. The county's stance towards higher-ups also somewhat alleviates its own responsibility.
Increasing pressure
First, urging lower levels to achieve performance and highlights to gain good rankings.
For example, in party-building materials, the province and city require the county level to submit ten work materials, while the county's organizational department assigns fifteen tasks to townships, which in turn add to the village level, resulting in more than fifteen tasks. All levels require lower levels to innovate. Similarly, the province requires that 30% of the members of township leadership under 35 years old, while the city requires the county to achieve 60%, and the county will exceed 80%.
Second, urging lower levels to do better work,
To cope with secret visits and other supervisory forms, avoiding being discovered and held accountable.
How to "reflect work"
Townships interpret the behavior of higher-level departments assigning non-central work tasks as:
"Reflecting work" means showing that they are also doing their jobs. The work that higher-level departments want to "reflect" can be of two types. One type is professional affairs related only to their own departments. There is comparison and competition between departments, especially among those with similar or connected functions. If other departments are working, their department must also work, and even do better than others. For example, the cultural bureau and the sports bureau have comparable work, seeing who provides more cultural and sports services in their jurisdiction. Even if there is no direct comparison, sending performance signals to the same-level party committee government and higher-level counterpart departments requires content to discuss, telling them what they have done.

The other type is politically task-oriented affairs.#

This refers to the central work of the local party committee government, where each professional department uses its own resources to carry out central work or reflect central work within professional affairs. For example, at the beginning of 2020, epidemic prevention and control was the central work of governments at all levels, and various departments were also busy contributing to it, needing to reflect their efforts in their work. For instance, women's federations in various places would count and comfort women returning from Wuhan, community property management would send their staff to the front lines of epidemic prevention, and the catering industry would provide meals for frontline personnel and infected individuals. All these efforts would be counted as part of the relevant departments' work to reflect their contributions to epidemic prevention.
To reflect work, actions must be taken. The more actions taken, the more work can be reflected. To this end, higher-level departments will undertake several complementary actions:

First, making virtual actions real.
In the past, when reflecting work was not necessary, general departmental work was either done superficially or done very little. Once work was assigned to townships, the workload would not be too heavy, and townships would prioritize their tasks. Now, every department must reflect work, so they must first turn existing superficial tasks into real ones. This is true for the work of the people's congress and the political consultative conference. Higher-ups assign tasks, and lower levels do the work. Once lower levels do the work, the higher-ups' work is completed, thus reflecting the higher-ups' work.
Second, creating work.
Higher-ups not only need to make existing tasks concrete but also need to do more work to better reflect their efforts. To reflect doing more work, higher-ups will continuously increase the number of departments or sections doing work, such as the organizational department's organization section, which has expanded from one section to three, turning the work of one section into that of three, incorporating previously neglected tasks, directly increasing the workload. Various sections compete with each other and continuously create new forms and content of work, which also significantly increases the workload. All these tasks ultimately need to be implemented at the grassroots level, inevitably increasing the workload of relevant departments and sections at the grassroots level. For example, party-building work is continuously created, with new content added each year; safety in schools, although the same tasks are done each year, have different themes, and all materials are redone each year.
Third, standardizing work.
Higher-ups do not directly do the work; to reflect work, they must ensure that lower levels genuinely carry out the work, which means monitoring the work. In the past, many tasks were considered complete once reported by townships, but this can no longer be done. Townships are not trustworthy; if they falsely report, and higher-ups discover issues, the higher-ups' work cannot be reflected, and they will face penalties. To ensure that townships act according to their intentions, higher-ups will issue corresponding standards when assigning tasks, requiring lower levels to follow the standards, and they will also check and accept according to the standards. For lower levels, following the standards and leaving traces at each step also proves that they have done the work, making it easier to report to higher-ups.
For higher-ups, if lower levels follow the standards, the results will not deviate from expectations, allowing them to reflect work. For example, as mentioned earlier regarding energy conservation and emission reduction work, higher-ups specify the specific content and materials that lower levels must report each month. Lower levels follow the steps and guidelines, allowing higher-ups to reflect work while lower levels can cope with inspections and complete tasks.
As a result, once it reaches the township level, previously superficial tasks must become real, the tasks to be done are increasing, and they must be done according to standards, leading to a multiplied increase in workload.
Why "reflect work"?
Essentially, it strengthens the supervision of the same-level party committee over work in various fields, creating a genuine work atmosphere.
Various fields and departments may also engage in both superficial and real work, creating more tasks and strengthening supervision over lower-level counterpart departments. For lower-level counterpart departments, they not only need to "reflect work" to the same-level party committee government but also to higher-level counterpart departments.

Second, the importance of leaders' impressions has increased.#

In grassroots county, township, and village levels, political considerations must be taken into account for any actions. When non-essential departments assign tasks to townships, townships may treat them casually, but if department leaders tell township party secretaries to consider the political aspect, the secretaries must pay attention. Once it rises to the political level, there is less room for maneuvering below. Although a certain task may not be important for a township, it is part of the overall work of the county. If the work of a certain township affects the work of the entire county, the township party secretary will be seen as lacking in overall awareness.
The comprehensive work assessment of the county towards townships sees all townships striving for high rankings. For other non-central, non-key tasks, townships mainly aim to avoid falling behind. Although these tasks do not enter the comprehensive assessment category, the annual assessment rankings are visible to the main leaders at the county level. If a township consistently ranks too low or shows significant regression, it leaves a poor impression on county leaders. Especially for work overseen by county committee standing committee members, if it is not done well, township leaders lose points in front of the standing committee, affecting future work and promotions because leaders mainly look at comprehensive rankings.
Of course, if a township does not take a certain task seriously and consistently ranks low, leaders of higher-level counterpart departments may also report to the main county leaders that the township does not consider politics or the bigger picture.
The competitive mechanism has stimulated the enthusiasm of middle-level cadres in the following four aspects:
First, positions are actively competed for, not assigned by leaders, so even the most challenging tasks must be tackled. This means that middle-level cadres must adapt to their roles and achieve results, which relates to their reputation and the need for self-validation. It is similar to a marriage chosen against the wishes of elders; after marriage, one must manage family life well to prove that the choice was correct.
Second, competitive appointments lead to a high match between people and positions. Middle-level cadres engage in work they enjoy, are suited for, or find challenging, which inherently motivates them.
Third, choosing their own tasks makes them more likely to treat the work as their own responsibility. Middle-level cadres develop an internal sense of responsibility towards their work, treating it as their own rather than merely completing tasks assigned by leaders, leading to greater enthusiasm and initiative.
Fourth, middle-level cadres are elected, indicating that they have gained recognition from all town leaders, which is both an honor and a responsibility, thus motivating them to perform well.
The same reasoning applies to the selection of ordinary cadres; during the selection process, they have already gone through a "picking and choosing" phase, so they cannot be "picky" or complain during their work.
This selection mechanism, as a personnel arrangement system, is an important reflection of the personnel authority of the party committee secretary.
Through innovative mechanisms, township party committee secretaries can mobilize the subjectivity, initiative, and enthusiasm of ordinary cadres even in the absence of personnel advisory rights, stimulating their intrinsic motivation to work.
Personnel advisory rights and decision-making rights are two different types of personnel authority. While township party committee secretaries strive for advisory rights, they should seek breakthroughs and innovations in personnel matters more through decision-making rights, ensuring a good match between people and positions.

The results of individual assessments have three operational pathways:#

First, rewards and punishments.
Award-winning townships will receive individual awards and rewards, such as a poverty alleviation award with a first prize of 300,000 yuan, which can be autonomously allocated by the township. Compared to project funds and fiscal expenditures, this is "liquid money" that can be freely allocated, including bonuses (with higher-level approval). This encourages townships to invest heavily in creating highlights to obtain "liquid money." Some individual assessment tasks will also hold year-end summary meetings, where awards and punishments are reported, experiences are exchanged, and statements are made.
Second, policy benefits,
such as an extra month's salary. Each individual award can lead to an extra month's salary. If a city wins a certain individual award from the province, all units in the city can receive an extra month's salary; if a county wins a certain individual award from the city, all units in the county can also receive an extra month's salary. Townships are no exception. By the end of the year, well-performing townships can receive an extra 5 to 8 months' salary. Some county-level units may even receive an extra 11 or 12 months' salary. The upper levels provide the policy, but the money still comes from the units. Some poor units may not have the funds to distribute awards even if they win. This is a reward for all staff in the unit, distributed according to their original salaries.
Third, political evaluation.
Individual assessments serve as an important indicator for the county to evaluate the main leaders of townships, functioning as a "single center" for comprehensive assessments. If a township wins an excellent award in comprehensive assessments (or good) and also receives multiple individual assessment awards, it indicates that the overall work of that township is at a high level; if it does not win awards in comprehensive assessments but receives multiple first prizes in individual work, it shows that the township has unique characteristics; if some important townships lag behind in most individual awards, only receiving one or two, it indicates that the main leaders of those townships are not performing well, which will affect the political evaluation of county leaders towards them. Conversely, if county leaders do not have a high evaluation of the main leaders of townships, it may lead to fewer individual assessment awards for those townships.
The content of knowledge learning for young grassroots cadres includes the following three aspects:

First, learning to improve theoretical literacy. Young grassroots cadres have a strong initiative to enhance their theoretical literacy. Improving theoretical literacy not only helps young cadres improve their theoretical level in writing materials but also enhances their ability to identify, view, analyze, and solve problems. For example, regarding a certain governance experience, young cadres with higher theoretical literacy can summarize and refine it, producing materials that capture key points and essence while also being visually impactful for promotion.
Second, learning to improve professional skills. Young grassroots cadres urgently need to enhance their professional skills. With the increasing specialization of grassroots governance, the work in various lines is becoming more specialized and specialized, posing significant challenges for non-professional personnel, particularly in townships, who need focused professional training, making professional learning outside of work increasingly important. For instance, before the 18th National Congress, cadres in the discipline inspection line did not focus on township discipline inspection work; their work mainly revolved around central tasks rather than discipline inspection business. After the 18th National Congress, township discipline inspection work became more stringent, requiring discipline inspection cadres to relearn legal knowledge across various fields, creating significant learning pressure. Additionally, many townships implement rotation systems to train young middle-level cadres (leaders of various stations and offices), requiring them to relearn professional knowledge each time they move to a new position, adding to their learning pressure.
Third, learning to improve comprehensive qualities.
Young grassroots cadres need to enhance their comprehensive qualities. Grassroots cadres, especially township cadres, are often versatile and need comprehensive knowledge and abilities. When encountering related issues, they must master relevant knowledge and possess the ability to solve related problems. Grassroots training for young cadres also adopts a multi-position training approach. Therefore, they need to acquire relevant knowledge while solving problems and learn and store relevant knowledge to address related issues.
For example, among young grassroots cadres, the director of the comprehensive office in a township pays attention to the most public accounts, ranging from dozens to hundreds, covering various themes such as policies, laws, politics, economics, culture, governance, agriculture, and daily life. This is because the comprehensive office is a coordinating department that deals with various affairs in townships and rural areas, requiring its director to master knowledge across various fields, which may also be applied in writing materials.
An office director once shared with researchers that when township staff buy cars, they consult her about fuel consumption, so she must understand the fuel consumption of major models and follow relevant public accounts; when a young female cadre inquired about infant formula knowledge, she had to pay attention to parenting-related public accounts.
How to stand out in the organization

The county discipline inspection commission mainly has two areas of work:#

One is handling cases, and the other is writing materials.
The work of writing materials is in the "Party Style Office," where the director assigns the deputy director to train there.
The Party Style Office director is a veteran who speaks loudly to anyone. Generally, county-level positions are low, and it is difficult to be promoted to deputy section chief.
When the director enters the Party Style Office, it coincides with the deputy director being promoted to director, and the director takes over as deputy director, becoming a formal section chief. The director does not interfere with the deputy director's work. This is beneficial for the director, as they can independently handle matters in the Party Style Office, directly connecting with the deputy secretary of the discipline inspection commission, quickly familiarizing themselves with basic work without needing to manage relationships with the director.
Ordinary civil servant positions can gain recognition and be reused by leaders by achieving the following six points:
First, being hardworking and diligent in completing their duties;
Second, not complaining about external factors, treating every job as an opportunity;
Third, alleviating leaders' worries and difficulties, finding ways to complete tasks assigned by leaders without shirking responsibilities;
Fourth, being innovative in work, neither sticking to conventions nor being overly rigid;
Fifth, being sincere, not seeking shortcuts in work, treating leaders without flattery and colleagues without duplicity;
Sixth, maintaining a positive attitude, pursuing progress without seeking promotion or wealth, and being able to handle setbacks in promotions with grace.
Grassroots political games manifest in the following two aspects:
First, the utilization of authoritative resources by line departments. The party committee government possesses authoritative resources, and if line departments can gain the support of the party committee government, they can better implement their policy tasks, including receiving more cooperation from other departments, and the grassroots levels will mobilize more resources for these policy tasks. Especially since county-level departments' policy tasks are implemented by townships, if they gain the attention of township party secretaries, their departmental affairs become priority work, and the township party secretary will focus on them, mobilizing quality resources for completion. For county-level departments, the quality of policy task implementation is higher, saving human and material resources. To gain the attention of township party secretaries, they must first attract the attention of county-level party committees and governments, ideally making it a task for the county-level party committee government.
County-level main leaders pay attention to:
First, if there are significant issues in departmental jurisdiction, even leading to public opinion problems, the main leaders will inevitably intervene;
Second, if departmental leaders lobby county-level main leaders, making the responsible leaders feel the importance, then the responsible leaders will lobby the county mayor and county party secretary;
Third, creating highlight work in departments to attract the attention of county-level main leaders;
Fourth, engaging in borderline activities, embedding "private work" in documents or files issued by the county-level party committee government, incorporating departmental affairs into them, thus becoming part of the county-level comprehensive assessment.
County-level main leaders have their own will, judgment, and focus, and they will not easily "bite" on proposals; their attention resources are not easily swayed.
Even if leaders show "attention," they will categorize their attention to departmental affairs: some are very important, some relatively important; some are emphasized for a long time, some for a short time; some will personally oversee and require responses, while others will delegate without further attention; some will hold on-site meetings, while others will convene joint meetings; some will issue documents, while others will only express verbally; some will be focused on by main leaders, while others will be emphasized by responsible leaders.
If leaders exert equal effort on everything, they will exhaust themselves without necessarily achieving good results. Thus, departmental leaders understand that attracting leaders' attention to their affairs is not easy; to persuade leaders, they must present solid reasons; otherwise, it will be a futile effort. Creating highlight work is not something that can be done casually. Therefore, departmental leaders will only approach leaders for truly important matters.
In the interaction and game between lines and blocks, only truly important or globally relevant departmental affairs will become political tasks for the county-level party committee government, and only then will county-level main leaders devote attention.
Conversely, general departmental affairs are unlikely to receive significant attention from county-level main leaders. This is the first equilibrium reached in the line-block game.
Second, the utilization of professional resources by blocks.
The party committee government does not possess specific governance resources, especially professional resources beyond human and financial resources, including special funds, professional personnel, technical expertise, equipment, and authority. These resources are held by government departments.
Professional resources are statutory; using them requires legal qualifications and permissions, following legal procedures, with many regulations that cannot be casually manipulated.
Government departments use resources according to legal principles to implement professional affairs, bearing the majority of county-level governance tasks. However, some affairs within the county are comprehensive and cannot be completed independently by any one department, requiring coordination of resources from multiple departments, including governance and policy topics initiated by county-level main leaders to realize their political ambitions, commonly referred to as "leader-driven work," such as various movement-style governance initiatives, specifically small town construction, agricultural funding integration, sanitation actions, three modifications and one demolition, and comprehensive tourism.
For county-level main leaders to implement their driven work, they must mobilize and integrate resources from relevant departments.
For leaders of relevant departments, on one hand, the tasks assigned by the county party committee government are "social affairs" outside their professional duties, which are additional tasks they do not wish to take on.
Thus, when leaders initially approach them, they instinctively seek various reasons to decline, hoping that the leader-driven work will "die in the womb."
On the other hand, leader-driven work is characterized by tight timelines, heavy tasks, and significant pressure. In the process of mobilizing and integrating departmental resources, it often requires changing the channels, directions, and paths of resource flow, which can lead to passive situations for departmental work.
Supporting the party committee government's work may require breaking rules; not supporting it can leave a poor impression on leaders, and in severe cases, departmental leaders may be reassigned or not reused.
For example, a district mayor discovered that the use of agricultural funds was scattered and chaotic, resulting in inefficiency, and sought to reform and integrate these funds.
The mayor first investigated at the finance bureau, where a deputy director and a chief opposed the mayor's proposal, arguing that the work was not compliant. The mayor became furious, and later, both were demoted to work in townships.
For leaders of government departments, they must "walk a tightrope" between not violating regulations and supporting the party committee government's work; they cannot completely refuse to support leader-driven work, nor can they blatantly violate regulations. They generally express support for the main leader's work but will also find many reasons to adjust the leader's thinking, not allowing themselves to be completely led by the leader's ideas or to act solely according to the leader's wishes. The main reason is related to relevant policies, laws, and regulations. When regulations are presented, leaders may suggest adjusting or bending them, and departments may use the rigidity of regulations as a shield, claiming that adjustments are too troublesome and require provincial approval, which takes too long.
If leaders want to completely abandon their ideas, they must provide sufficiently strong and legitimate reasons to dissuade them. Such situations are generally rare.
For leaders, to turn their ideas into county-level work, they must first help relevant departmental leaders understand their ideas and intentions, transforming their ideas into the leaders' ideas, thereby gaining support for work and jointly formulating and implementing policies.
This requires leaders to frequently participate in various research meetings, discussion meetings, negotiation meetings, and mobilization meetings, with their main attention focused here.
County-level leaders, in communicating and negotiating with departments, must propose coping strategies based on the actual situation of departments and timely adjust their ideas. Leaders must insist on their views while also presenting suitable reasons to persuade departmental leaders, avoiding a purely command-based approach.

The back-and-forth game involves debate, compromise, competition, and struggle, consuming a significant amount of leaders' time and energy.

Since government departments are not entirely "obedient" nor completely unreasonable, they will exert a "constraint" and "supervision" effect on the work leaders wish to promote. Leaders' attention is a scarce resource, and "leaders stepping in" is the most scarce resource:

Only truly important matters will prompt leaders to step in and be physically present. For leaders to promote work, they must engage in face-to-face communication, coordination, and negotiation with departments, consuming the most scarce resources.
Due to the constraints from government departments, leaders cannot easily accomplish "promoting work," so for leaders, the work they wish to promote must be genuinely important and recognized by departments, rather than trivial matters being brought to the forefront for promotion.
In other words, under the line-block relationship system, it is not easy for county-level main leaders to accomplish tasks, so they must choose to focus on important matters.
In this system, doing good work is not easy, and doing bad work is relatively difficult as well. Because of departmental constraints, the probability of doing bad work decreases, while the likelihood of doing accepted good work increases. This is the apparent logic. This is the second equilibrium reached in the line-block game.
In summary, the transformation of departmental business into political tasks for the party committee government involves important business, while the work of the party committee government to integrate departmental resources is also significant. Only important matters can be transformed into political tasks, and only important matters can justify the integration of departmental resources.
In the implementation of work, the relationship between departments and townships
With increasing emphasis on work implementation, county-level departments must strengthen their efforts.
Departments can take two measures:
First, strengthen the "legs" of departments established in townships and villages, enhancing work implementation through the improvement of departmental organizational systems. In Beijing's Pinggu District, each department not only has its own station in townships but also employs full-time staff at the village level, such as judicial officers from the judicial office, civil affairs staff from the civil affairs office, disability assistance staff from the disabled persons' federation, and land assistants from the land office. The more complete the departmental organizational system, the stronger the force, and the better the implementation of work tasks. All departments hope to have "long legs," continuously appealing to the organization office for staffing.
Second, strengthen the motivation for townships through the emphasis of township party governments to promote departmental work implementation. This involves the relationship between departments and townships within the line-block system. Departments are the units primarily responsible for business work, which needs to be implemented in townships, and the implementation of departmental work is related to the level of attention from townships.
As a level of party government, townships have their own priorities and judgments and will not exert equal effort on all departmental affairs. Thus, for departments to implement their work well, they must compete for the attention of township main leaders, fully mobilizing their enthusiasm. Although departments represent the county party committee and government, townships cannot shirk their responsibilities for departmental work, but in terms of hierarchy, townships and departments are at the same level, and there is no subordinate relationship, meaning departments cannot force townships to prioritize their work.
In most areas, the departmental organizational system has not yet penetrated to the village level, and in townships, it mainly relies on the related forces within the townships themselves. Therefore, departmental work implementation primarily mobilizes township forces. Departments can mobilize townships through personal relationships, for example, if a bureau chief has a good personal relationship with a township party secretary, they may call to urge the secretary to prioritize their work. However, personal relationships are incidental, and departments need to mobilize townships through institutional norms, which involves the issue of line-block relationships.

The mobilization of townships by departments mainly involves two methods:#

One is resource mobilization, and the other is assessment mobilization,
Forming a relationship of resource allocation and assessment distribution between departments and townships. The relationship evolves into that between county-level departments and township streets. Departments need to allocate resources to townships, while townships need autonomy, and township cadres must "self-rescue," leading to various countermeasures such as evading responsibility and formalism.
Within the unit, the personnel authority of main leaders includes two aspects:
First, decision-making authority, which refers to the authority to make decisions regarding middle-level and lower-level cadres within the unit.
This is the main power of unit leaders, who use personnel decision-making authority to motivate ordinary and middle-level cadres.
Second, recommendation authority, which refers to the power to recommend middle-level leaders or team members from the unit to higher-level organizational departments. For individuals within the unit to gain recognition from the organizational department, the recommendations and opinions of the unit's main leaders are crucial.
The more cadres from the unit that the main leader recommends to the organizational department and who are promoted and reused, the faster the flow of leadership cadres within the unit, and the greater the motivation for leadership cadres within the unit.

The personnel recommendation authority of unit leaders depends on their political status and political prospects within the jurisdiction. If a unit leader has a high political status in the jurisdiction, such as having served as the party secretary of multiple townships and as the head of various departments, then in terms of both qualifications and work ability, that leader will have a high level of recognition in county politics, possessing a voice in county-level politics and face before county leaders, making it easier for their recommended cadres to gain approval. For example, if a party secretary transforms an economically backward and politically unstable township into a star township in the county, gaining recognition from county leaders and all county cadres, that party secretary will have a high status in county politics, and the organizational department and county leaders will provide more support to them. If the county does not support these politically high-status unit leaders and does not consider their recommendations, how can they motivate these individuals?
Leaders with political prospects and political futures will have subordinates with greater prospects for development and a higher likelihood of upward mobility, enhancing their political status locally. Thus, working under leaders with political prospects provides strong political motivation for subordinates, encouraging them to work hard, which in turn enhances the organizational mobilization power of leaders over the unit.
When a unit is mobilized by the organization, more people work hard, and more people are diligent, making it easier for leaders' will to be implemented, leading to better performance by the unit. In political competitions, unit leaders are more likely to succeed, gaining political status and prospects, thus having a greater voice in the political life of the jurisdiction, creating positive feedback.
Conversely, if the main leader of a unit lacks status in the political life of the jurisdiction and is perceived as having no political future, their personnel recommendation authority in higher-level organizational departments or among leaders will be weak, leading to fewer cadres from the unit being recommended upward, resulting in less personnel flow within the unit, and many cadres may remain stagnant for years, leading to low work enthusiasm. At the same time, if the main leader of the unit lacks political status and prospects, it will negatively impact the status of the unit and its staff in the political life of the jurisdiction, making them feel constrained in comparisons or evaluations with other units and their staff.

For instance, in annual evaluations, weaker units have fewer quotas and are looked down upon by other units and their staff. Fewer people will follow such unit leaders, and not many will heed their words or directives, let alone actively help them solve problems.
Consequently, the mobilization power of unit leaders over their staff weakens, making it difficult to promote many tasks within the unit. The unit will lag in competitions, and the leader's status in the political life of the jurisdiction will be lower, leading to even less personnel flow within the unit, creating negative feedback.
Leaders without political prospects (status) lead to low enthusiasm among subordinates; leaders with political prospects (status) lead to high enthusiasm among subordinates.
This is the basic principle of "unit politics." As Professor Fang Ning said, the official title is the "master switch" for cadres, and using official titles to motivate officials returns to the fundamental laws of political recruitment.
Leaders with political status and prospects imply that subordinates may obtain greater official titles, which can motivate and mobilize subordinates.
Third, there are differences in the sources of authority.
At the frontline, leadership authority comes from the power granted by positions; the more important the position, the greater the power, and the more authority one has in front of subordinates. For example, the township party secretary is the top leader in the township, and their power exceeds that of the township head and other team members, giving them more authority in front of subordinates.
Additionally, leadership authority also derives from personal ability and charisma.
The personal abilities of frontline leaders include mobilizing resources, coordinating relationships, solving problems, and responding to crises. The stronger their abilities, the more leadership charisma they possess, leading subordinates to admire them and willingly follow their directives.
Conversely, if a leader is incompetent, unable to solve problems, or "an outsider leading insiders," they will not establish credibility in front of subordinates, who will not respect their commands or leadership, leading to a lack of loyalty and effort from subordinates. For the authority of frontline leaders, both power and ability are complementary and indispensable.
At non-frontline levels, the abilities and personal charisma of leaders are less important; as long as they occupy a position of power, their commands and directives will be conveyed, arranged, and executed by subordinates.
The so-called "power operation" is essentially the transmission of political will between leaders and subordinates, and the smoothness of this transmission relates to the state of the relationship between "leaders and subordinates."
"Unit politics" discusses the importance of leaders having political status and prospects for gaining loyalty and organizing the mobilization of subordinates. Subordinates tie their political futures to their leaders, as loyalty is not born from fear of leadership power but from a genuine commitment to the leader.
The basic principle of "frontline politics" is that because problem-solving is direct, frontline leaders need to possess the corresponding abilities to solve specific issues, which is both a requirement from the frontline for leaders and an expectation from subordinates. If leaders can meet these requirements and expectations, they can establish an "authority-loyalty" relationship with subordinates, facilitating the organization and mobilization of subordinates.
Grassroots areas do not lack personnel; they lack resources such as finance, power, and policies.
To do good work, it is necessary to mobilize staff to the maximum extent. The "line-block combination" system divides township work into hierarchical work, grassroots work, and key work, and through a "two-way selection" approach, different personnel are assigned to different work positions, achieving an optimal combination of people and tasks, and between people, thus unifying work with training and motivation, comprehensively mobilizing the enthusiasm of township cadres.
The river chief system operates within the party and government system, with its authority derived from the party committee's power, also being part of a pressure-based system.
The party committee only assigns responsibilities without corresponding funding and institutional support.
The responsibility system requires a supervision system to be implemented, and the grassroots supervision system includes three aspects: inspection, inspection, and supervision.
Inspection corresponds to the responsibility of doing tasks, supervision corresponds to the responsibility of fulfilling duties, and inspection corresponds to the responsibility of making statements. Thus, although inspection, supervision, and inspection all imply oversight and checking, the content they oversee differs: inspection focuses on "tasks," supervision focuses on "duties," and inspection focuses on "responsibilities." Each has its own division of labor while being interconnected.
Inspection focuses on tasks.
The so-called "task inspection" is to urge responsible individuals to complete tasks according to the nature of the tasks. Inspections are the oversight and checks by the party committee government or line departments on the completion of assigned work, belonging to business inspections.
Inspection tasks fall into two categories:
One is prescribed inspections, where the inspection office conducts inspections based on key task arrangements;
The other is based on feedback from responsible departments or third parties regarding problematic tasks, conducting oversight and checks.
Specific inspection methods include research and secret visits, understanding the situation, writing reports, providing feedback to responsible parties, and requiring rectification opinions within a specified timeframe. After feedback on rectifications, the inspection office may also conduct follow-up visits to check the implementation of rectifications and report the situation to the county committee or county government. If the main responsible unit does not rectify adequately, the reasons must be identified. If it is an objective reason, the objective problem continues to be addressed; if it is a subjective issue, such as an attitude problem or disciplinary violation, the problem clues will be handed over. Inspections achieve a closed loop.
Under the supervision and accountability system, the relationship between county and township governments has been reshaped, and the relationship between upper and lower-level governments is no longer one of mutual "collusion" but rather one of mutual evasion of responsibility. To enforce lower-level accountability, higher levels must increase accountability measures; once problems arise, they first pursue accountability at lower levels, and the greater the accountability pursued, the more responsibility they can evade. Lower levels may respond to pressure from higher levels by leaving traces rather than substantively improving work.