[AI Rapid Reading Intelligence Analysis] Houthi Armed Forces Intelligence Collection

The report compares the missiles and drones of Iran with the weapons displayed and used by the Houthi forces in Yemen, strongly suggesting that these weapons come from Iran, and that Iranian assistance has enabled the Houthis to launch missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure in the region. Since 2015, Iran's relationship with the Houthis has deepened, with Iran providing advanced weapons and training that have allowed the Houthis to effectively threaten the Yemeni government and the broader Middle East. Statements from Iranian leaders and Tehran's arms proliferation activities indicate that Iran views the Houthis as an extension of its power projection and destabilization efforts in the region.

Since 2014, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) has provided the Houthis with increasing amounts of advanced weapons and training, which the Houthis have used to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea and civilian ports and energy infrastructure throughout the region. The United States and its partners have intercepted at least 18 smuggling vessels, seizing components for ballistic missiles, UAVs, anti-tank missiles, thousands of assault rifles, rocket components, and other illegal weapons.

Since 2018, the Houthis have been using Sammad drones similar to Iran's Sayad (also known as KAS-04). These UAVs have nearly identical features, including a V-shaped tail and flight control surfaces at the wingtips. These features are clearly visible on the wreckage of the Sammad drone used in a Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia in July 2018, as well as on the Sayad displayed by Iran in March 2023.

Since 2015, Iran has provided the Houthis with a diverse array of short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, including anti-ship missiles, enabling the Houthis to attack land and maritime targets. Iran's ballistic and cruise missiles have allowed the Houthis to strike targets from various angles. In 2013, the Houthis launched the Burkan-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) for the first time, using it to attack Saudi Arabia. In 2021, the Houthis showcased a system consistent with Iran's Diam/Rezvan MRBM, giving it a new name—Zulfiqar. Since 2019, the Houthis have launched Burkan-3 missiles at several countries in the region. Iran also launched Qiam variants during its attack on Iraq's Al Asad airbase in 2020.

Since 2017, Iran has been proliferating advanced drones to conflict zones worldwide. These drones combine range, low cost, and explosive payloads, enabling the Houthis, other Iran-aligned militias, and conflict actors like Russia to threaten territorial sovereignty, regional stability, and the global economy. At least since 2015, Iran has provided the Houthis with various medium- and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles, including anti-ship missiles, allowing the Houthis to attack land and maritime targets.

The Iranian-backed Houthis are a radical Shia group that has controlled the most populous areas of Yemen since 2014. In response, a Saudi-led coalition launched a military operation in 2015 to prevent the group from conquering all of Yemen and to restore the internationally recognized Yemeni government. The Houthis have received training and weapons from "axis of resistance" organizations, including Hezbollah and the IRGC, which has led to a stalemate for the coalition and the launch of hundreds of rockets and missiles at Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Despite international efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the Yemeni civil war, the Houthis appear unwilling to compromise, and after about a year and a half of relative calm, they are likely preparing for a new round of fighting.

The Yemeni civil war has devastated the country. Due to the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on the Houthis, their war machine cannot obtain weapons through legal means. However, this has not stopped them from doing so in a way that evades regulation to ensure the continued acquisition of critical materials. The Houthis have established a clandestine arms procurement network using their ill-gotten gains. The U.S. designation of Saleh Mesfer al-Shaer has provided some insight into how this mechanism operates. According to a November 2021 announcement from the U.S. Treasury, "Major General Saleh Mesfer al-Shaer is a close ally of Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who is both the commander of the military logistics support organization controlled by the Houthis, helping the Houthis obtain smuggled weapons, and an official responsible for managing all assets and funds seized by the Houthis."

It is alleged that al-Shaer has seized assets worth over $100 million under Houthi supervision, some of which were later signed over to al-Shaer's family, including his brother Abdullah and nephew Raed. The targets of these extortion schemes include Yemeni politicians opposing the Houthis, banks, private businesses, and even hospitals. Those Yemenis who refuse to comply with al-Shaer's demands for asset surrender face indefinite detention by Houthi internal security agencies. *The seized assets are then used to fund the purchase and smuggling of weapons for the Houthis. Under Executive Order 13611, al-Shaer has been sanctioned for engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.

Sanctioned Houthi official Saleh Mesfer al-Shaer (second from right) In March 2021, Houthi naval commander Mansur al-Sa'adi and Houthi air force commander Ahmad 'Ali Ahsan al-Hamzi were also designated by the U.S. Treasury under Executive Order 13611 for engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Both have been accused of playing a role in obtaining Iranian-made weapons, which were then used in the Yemeni civil war. Al-Hamzi died in "mysterious circumstances" in the summer of 2023, which will be detailed later in this report.

> General Mansur al-Sa'adi (far right).

A scene from a "martyr video" made for General Hamzi after his death.

However, many other Houthi officials work in military and defense procurement roles while remaining largely unknown. This report aims to list the senior leadership of the Houthi procurement and logistics departments, as well as the companies/entities that facilitate these activities. The report will cover the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior, as in the Houthi regime, as in many Arab dictatorships, the Ministry of Interior is one of the most powerful departments overseeing the country's main intelligence and security agencies. Due to the opaque nature of the clandestine procurement networks, this report cannot claim to be comprehensive, but it will significantly aid in exposing the entire cadre of Houthi officials and entities engaged in sanctionable activities. The importance of military and defense procurement issues for the Houthis seems to have diminished following the recent Saudi-Iran conflict de-escalation agreement and ongoing Saudi-Houthi ceasefire negotiations. However, despite Iran's promise to Saudi Arabia to stop supplying weapons to the Houthis and to cease Houthi participation in peace negotiations, Sana'a continues to expand its arsenal with new and improved weapons from Iran. In August 2023, following the signing of an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the deaths of Houthi leaders Ahmed al-Hamzi and Mohammed al-Hammasi were reported, allegedly due to an explosion during a test launch of new weapons by senior Houthi officials and their Iranian and Hezbollah advisors. The suspicions surrounding the circumstances of these senior officials' deaths were exacerbated by conflicting and vague explanations from Houthi news sources regarding al-Hamzi's death, which did not clarify the cause of death without considering the situation of the Houthi commander's death. The Houthis publicly displayed their latest weapons during an annual military parade in Sana'a on September 21, 2023. As rockets and missiles were paraded past the podium, Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree announced the following new members of the organization's arsenal:

Toufan: A long-range ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on Iran's "Qadr" missile, with a range of approximately 2000 kilometers.
Tankeel: A medium-range ballistic missile with both ground-to-ground and anti-ship versions, possibly based on Iran's Raad-500.
Aqeel: A long-range ground-to-ground missile based on Iran's "Qiam," with a range of 800 kilometers but upgraded to include precision guidance.
Quds-4: The latest model in the ground-to-ground precision-guided Quds missile series (following the Quds1-3 versions), reportedly with a range of up to 2000 kilometers*, featuring advanced stealth capabilities. The Houthi Quds missiles are based on Iran's "Soumar"/"Hoveyzeh" missile family.

Given that Yemen has no known advanced defense industrial base, it is reasonable to assume that the recently claimed domestically produced "Leap" capabilities are actually provided by external sources. Given the apparent similarities between the new Houthi missiles and known Iranian missile systems, and the fact that Iran has previously been the main source of weapons for the Houthis, these weapons are highly likely to have been supplied by the Islamic Republic.

Newly unveiled Houthi Toufan (top) and Iranian Ghadr-1* (bottom) Considering the nature of the Houthis, one should be skeptical of their claims on nearly all issues, including military and industrial capabilities. In fact, a keen observer noted that during the 2023 parade, the Zelzal-3 was rolling in the wind and needed to be held in position—indicating that what the Houthis were displaying was a model rather than an actual rocket. This would confirm an expert's analysis that the militia possesses little (if any) Zelzal-3, merely showcasing these models to make the Houthi arsenal "look stronger than it actually is." However, a proper skeptical attitude is far from the situation of assuming that all Houthi claims are nonsense, especially considering their previously demonstrated weapon capabilities (regardless of the source) and the fact that during the recent parade, the organization flew F-5 fighter jets overhead, astonishing the crowd. At least since 2015, the Houthis have had no manned aerial capabilities, and despite the Saudi-led operations to weaken their capabilities continuing for eight years, they seem to have only recently acquired such power. It is reasonable to assume that this aircraft, or at least any necessary repair parts, also came from Iran. After more than eight years of fighting against the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis showcased a repaired F-5 fighter jet during the parade on September 23, 2023.

After the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel war on October 7, 2023, the Houthis recently attacked Israel, initially seemingly without using the organization's recently announced weapon systems. However, in a video released by Houthi propaganda agencies regarding the organization's missile launches at Israel, at least part of it appears to be recycled. Regardless, the attack on Israel highlights the risks posed by the extremist Houthi movement to the region. On the Yemeni battlefield, after a long period of relative calm, the Houthis seem to be escalating, in addition to being more aggressive in regional activities. Reports indicate that in the summer of 2023, the Houthis gathered approximately 30,000 troops near Marib, a region rich in Yemen's oil resources. Before the ceasefire in April 2022, they had desperately sought to conquer this area. In late September 2023, just days after a round of Saudi-Houthi peace negotiations concluded in Riyadh, the Houthis issued a threatening message to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, launching a drone attack that killed four Bahraini soldiers serving in the Saudi-led coalition in the border region. Then, in late October, they killed four Saudi soldiers in cross-border clashes. Despite significant investments in diplomatic efforts to end the Yemeni civil war, political agreements are unlikely to curb the extremist ideology of the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has made significant overtures toward achieving a peaceful outcome in Yemen, while the Houthis have shown little flexibility, and if Saudi Arabia does not accept all their demands, they will continue to threaten the Kingdom with new violence. However, even if Saudi Arabia and the Houthis reach a ceasefire agreement, it will be difficult to enforce and will not comprehensively cover the latter's ambitions to engage in malign activities throughout the region, including attacks on southern Yemen, the UAE, Israel, and U.S. interests in the Middle East. Regardless of the outcome of peace negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, the Houthis will remain a well-equipped and dangerous member of Iran's "axis of resistance." The following section lists individuals and entities involved in procuring tools and resources that make the Houthi defense and intelligence organization more dangerous.

Brigadier General Abu Abdul Majid (عبدالله“أبو عبدالمجيد“مسفر الشاعر)

Current Position: President of Shibam Holding, Director of Yemen Armor Company, Chairman of the Board of Sana'a Sabafon and Y Mobile telecommunications providers.
Former Position: Director of Logistics and Supply at the Ministry of Interior (unknown-2018).

Abdullah Mesfer al-Shaer is the brother of sanctioned Houthi leader Saleh Mesfer al-Shaer. Based on collected evidence, Abdullah is likely working in the same field as his brother Saleh: managing the procurement for the Houthis and controlling assets seized from political opponents of the regime. He is well-suited to work in these areas, having served as the Director of Logistics and Supply at the Ministry of Interior until 2018, and since 2019, he has been the chairman of the Shibam Holding Company and several other large companies.

Yemen Armor Company
In July 2019, Abdullah was appointed as a director of the private security company Yemen Armor. The Houthis detained the former owner of Yemen Armor, Ahmed Saleh Ali Arrahbi, and then seized Arrahbi's company. Under Abdullah al-Shaer's directorship, the company paid millions of dollars to Saleh al-Shaer's nephew Raed Hassan Mesfer al-Shaer for unknown reasons. Some Yemeni news media have also suggested that the Houthis use Yemen Armor as a front to legitimize their acquisition of military and security capabilities abroad. In 2019, when the UN became aware that Yemen Armor had been seized and was now under Houthi control, the UN stated that it had previously been unaware of the change in ownership but did not indicate that it would end its business relationship with the company. It remains unclear whether the UN and other humanitarian organizations listed as clients on the company's website (such as the World Food Program, Save the Children, UNICEF, etc.) continue to fund the company, which is evidently a slush fund for the al-Shaer family and funds activities aligned with the Houthis. In the case of UNICEF, significant questions arise regarding discrepancies in the organization's annual budget. In 2018, before the Houthis took over Yemen Armor, UNICEF contracted the Mama Security Company and Yemen Armor for "security and safety services" at prices of $2.3 million and $1 million, respectively. In 2019, after formally realizing that the Houthis had taken over Yemen Armor, UNICEF's budget had no line item for "security and safety services"—a strange budget cut for an organization operating in a conflict zone. Then, in 2020, UNICEF again listed $2 million for services from Stallion Security without listing other security and safety providers. It is difficult to understand why the security and safety budget in Yemen would shrink by a third in two years without any significant changes on the ground. One possible explanation for the discrepancy in security spending between 2018 and 2020 is that factors like currency devaluation depressed vendor prices, allowing Stallion Security to provide $3.3 million worth of services from two vendors in 2018 for $2 million. However, this seems unlikely, as UNICEF typically operates in dollars rather than local currency, and during those years, UNICEF's total local procurement budget in Yemen jumped from $131 million to $246 million, rather than contracting. A more likely explanation is that the organization used other means to pay for services that were difficult to budget for: either including them in the budget under vague company names and categories or using cash, with the unconditional cash transfer program launched in 2019 possibly facilitating cash use. Since 2021, UNICEF has stopped publishing itemized budgets for Yemen.

Major General Abdullah al-Shaer (far left) received an award from the Logistics and Supply Council for achievements during his tenure. Standing to his right is Ismail Mo'ayyed, who succeeded al-Shaer.

Raed Hassan Mesfer al-Shaer (center) is photographed in a Facebook post from a forum, criticized for holding multiple honorary positions in universities, hospitals, and private companies due to family connections.

Shibam Holding (شبام القابضة) was established by the Yemeni government as its private investment arm and was seized by the Houthis after their takeover of Sana'a in 2014. Given that Abdullah al-Shaer was appointed chairman of Shibam Holding around 2019, the company is likely engaged in activities funding the Houthi war and/or military procurement. The Geneva-based human rights organization SAMRL, dedicated to monitoring human rights conditions in the Middle East, describes Shibam as "a quasi-government company through which the revenues of seized companies are invested."

This is the official logo on the social media accounts of Shibam Holding and Yemen Armor Company. Compared to other national investment funds, the operations of Shibam Holding seem to be secretive. When examining Shibam's digital footprint, including its website, Facebook page, and Twitter account, there is little information about its activities, assets, or plans, aside from a possible real estate development agreement with a similarly opaque Yemeni company, Ard al-Khayrat (شركه ارض الخيرات للتموين والتوريدات والمناقصات المحدودة). Ard al-Khayrat's Facebook page was created on July 16, 2021, and just five days later, it announced a partnership project with Shibam Holding and the Yemeni Ministry of Transport. Notably, there is also a Shibam Group Holding Limited registered in Ras al-Khaimah, UAE. This UAE-based company remains active and recently acquired a controlling stake in Saba Investment Company, which owns the Sana'a-based Cipla Pharmaceutical and Chemical Industries Company. As both the procurement company (Shibam) and the acquired company (Saba) are located in the UAE and listed their actual mailing addresses in a post office box, along with their email addresses at Deloitte and Baker Tilly International consulting firms, it is difficult to see who the main stakeholders are. However, Shibam and Saba were registered on the same day (January 7, 2014) in Ras al-Khaimah, and their business registration numbers are consecutive (11584542 and 11584543), which seems unusual. Given that registering businesses in Ras al-Khaimah is a rather rare choice, this becomes even more peculiar; less than 5% of the over 600,000 businesses registered in the UAE are registered in Ras al-Khaimah. This apparent coincidence suggests that these two companies may have always been connected, and Shibam's acquisition of Saba could be an action to transfer illicit wealth.

Shibam Holding (top) and Saba Investment Company (bottom) business registration in Ras al-Khaimah.

Major General Ismail al-Moayyed (إسماعيل المؤيد)
Current Position: Director of the Immigration and Passport Bureau. Former Position: Director of the Logistics Supply Department at the Ministry of Interior (2019-2020).

Major General Ismail al-Moayyed has held senior positions within the Houthi regime, as have other family members. In fact, Ismail al-Moayyed's brother Nabil "Abu Mostafa" al-Moayyed served as the commander of the southern military front in Marib until his death in 2023.

> Major General Ismail al-Moayyed, former Director of the Logistics and Supply Bureau.

Ismail's brother Nabil's martyr poster, who served as the commander of the southern front in Marib until his death in 2023.

Ismail al-Moayyed's recent positions within the regime include senior leadership roles in the Ministry of Interior. He appears to have served as the Director of the Logistics and Supply Department around 2019 and remained in that position until the end of 2020. As noted in the case of Abdullah al-Shaer, this role includes utilizing illicit assets for procurement for the regime. In his farewell speech upon leaving the bureau, al-Moayyed emphasized that the bureau "plays a crucial role in the success of security agencies." Al-Moayyed's successor praised the bureau's achievements during al-Moayyed's tenure, despite the challenges posed by the anti-Houthi coalition. Since 2020, al-Moayyed has served as the Director of the Immigration and Passport Management Bureau.

Deputy Director of the Logistics and Supply Bureau Fahd Ali Taher (front row, center) Ghamdan Haji (right), al-Moayyed's chief of staff during his tenure in the council.

During al-Moayyed's tenure as Director of the Logistics and Supply Bureau, Colonel Fahd Ali Taher (فهد علي طاهر) served as his deputy. Al-Moayyed's chief of staff was Haji (غمدان الحجي). As of 2023, Taher appears to still be serving in this role.

Brigadier General Osama Abdullah Mufaddal (أسامةعبداللهمفضل) Current Position: Director of the Logistics and Supply Department at the Ministry of Interior (2020-present). Previous Position: Unknown.

Brigadier General Osama Mufaddal has served as the Director of the Logistics and Supply Department since at least December 2020 and continues to hold this position as of this writing. In 2021, Mufaddal awarded his predecessor Ismail al-Moayyed the "Honor Shield Award" issued by the Logistics and Supply Council. Little information is available about Mufaddal's previous positions, and it is presumed that he held a secret position within the regime before taking on his current role. Overall, there are few newcomers among the Houthi elite. It consists of long-time loyalists to the Houthi movement and those from prominent families closely related to the Houthi clan.

Brigadier General Osama Mufaddal (second from right in the front row) As previously mentioned, Colonel Fahd Ali Taher continues to serve as Deputy Director of the Logistics and Supply Bureau. However, also appointed as Mufaddal's deputy is Brigadier General Abdul Quddus al-Dailami (العميد الركن عبد القدوس الديلمي). Before serving as Deputy Director of the Bureau, al-Dailami was the deputy commander of the Central Security Forces. The Central Security Forces are a counterintelligence organization tasked with ensuring the survival of the Houthi regime against domestic threats.

Major General Muhammad "Abu Jaafar" al-Talbi (محمد”أبوجعف”رالطالبي) Current Position: Assistant Minister of Defense for Logistics and Director of Military Procurement. Former Position: Unknown.

Like Saleh Mesfer al-Shaer, Major General Muhammad al-Talbi also serves as the Assistant Minister of Defense responsible for logistics. Al-Talbi appears to share or inherit al-Shaer's portfolio, as they are of the same rank. Both are assistant ministers of defense with the rank of major general. However, in the Houthi leadership structure, formal rank does not necessarily represent actual rank, and UN expert groups assess that al-Talbi has become al-Shaer's assistant. According to Yemen expert Michael Knights, al-Shaer and al-Talbi have divided responsibilities in smuggling weapons. Al-Shaer coordinates with IRGC weapon suppliers, while al-Talbi coordinates the overland transport network, handling the trucking of smuggled goods to their storage locations. Whether al-Shaer and al-Talbi are currently working together or have previously held this role, their areas of responsibility are presumably similar, still requiring the use of illicit assets to fund the Houthi weapons program. Given that al-Talbi is not only the Assistant Minister of Defense responsible for logistics but also the head of procurement at the Ministry of Defense, he is likely overseeing the Houthis' efforts to build capabilities by acquiring foreign capabilities and/or developing domestic production of weapons. Al-Talbi's deputy is Brigadier General Adel Moayyed (عادل المؤيد), and al-Talbi's chief of staff is Colonel Adnan al-Halyani (عدنانالحلياني).

Major General Abdelmalik al-Durra (عبدالملك الدرة) Current Position: Deputy Director of the Logistics Support Department at the Ministry of Defense (2019-present). Former Position: Director of the Logistics and Supply Department at the Ministry of Defense, Commander of the Al Hudaydah Air Defense Forces, Minister of Air Force Intelligence.

Unlike many senior officials appointed by the Houthis, Major General al-Durra is a career officer who served in the armed forces of the Yemeni government during the decades-long rule of strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh ruled Yemen since the unification of Yemen in 1990 until he was overthrown in the Arab Spring uprising in 2012. After being ousted, he allied with his former adversaries, the Houthis, to overthrow the transitional government under President Hadi. Al-Durra is believed to be one of Saleh's supporters who followed the former president's alliance with the Houthis and one of the Saleh supporters who, despite the conflict that erupted between Saleh and the Houthis in 2017, which led to the former's ousting, still gained and maintained significant authority. Before the Houthis took power in 2014, al-Durra served as the Minister of Air Force Intelligence and Commander of the Al Hudaydah Air Defense Forces. Since then, al-Durra has served as the Director of Logistics and Supply for the Houthis and then as the Deputy Director of the Logistics Support Agency at the Ministry of Defense. *His current position in the Logistics Support Agency is as the deputy to U.S.-designated Houthi official Saleh Mesfer al-Shaer.

Houthi official Abu Malik al-Durra (top right) in a yearbook photo taken in the 1980s during the early years of his military career. Al-Durra (far right) photographed in 2023 while serving as Deputy Director of the Logistics Support Agency at the Houthi Ministry of Defense.

Hadi "Abu Ali" al-Kahlani (هادي״أبوعلي״الكحلاني) Current Position: Director of Security in Ibb (since 2022). Former Position: Director of Security in Al Hudaydah (2017-2022), member of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi's personal protection team.

Hadi "Abu Ali" al-Kahlani's first known role in the Houthi regime was as a bodyguard for the organization's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. He has held this position since at least 2013 and has leveraged his relationship with the Houthis to gain senior positions in key areas. There are credible reports that al-Kahlani has received training in Iran.

Around 2013, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi gave a televised speech with al-Kahlani visible in the background standing guard. In 2022, al-Kahlani (front row left) served as the Minister of Security in Ibb. In 2017, al-Kahlani's name first appeared in the media in reference to the coastal province of Al Hudaydah. He served as the security chief for the Houthis there until 2022, but when he began this role, it was not officially announced that he would leave a few years later. During his tenure as the security chief in Al Hudaydah, al-Kahlani engaged in power struggles with other senior officials, including the governor and the head of criminal investigations. Ultimately, he had both arrested and emerged victorious. In 2018, Al Hudaydah was at the forefront of the Yemeni civil war, and under UN mediation, the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition reached a ceasefire agreement to ensure that Yemen's maritime lifeline would not be cut off or destroyed due to ongoing conflict. Al-Kahlani appears to be a senior official responsible for the Houthis' relations with the UN-supported Al Hudaydah Agreement mission. *The UN Refugee Agency is responsible for overseeing the ports of Al Hudaydah to prevent arms smuggling into Yemen. The three key ports in Al Hudaydah (i.e., Al Hudaydah, Salif, and Ras Isa) make it a central component of the Houthi's economic and military supply lines. Given that al-Kahlani controls the province of Al Hudaydah and has connections with the UN and the UN Refugee Agency, he is well-positioned to assist the Houthis in smuggling weapons into Yemen. Indeed, power in Al Hudaydah is concentrated in al-Kahlani's hands, and the fact that many smuggling activities occur in that territory strongly suggests that he is at least aware of these activities. Al-Kahlani was effectively orchestrating arms trafficking through Al Hudaydah until it was exposed in 2022—through testimonies from Houthi smugglers intercepted and detained by the coalition. In June 2022, al-Kahlani was reassigned as the security chief in Ibb. Considering al-Kahlani's reputation as a ruthless ruler trusted by the Houthi rebels, his transfer to Ibb may have been to ensure that this predominantly Sunni area on the front lines of the Houthi rebels does not breed rebellion against the Zaidi rulers of Sana'a.

Wadi Kabir Company (شركةالواديالكبيرللخدماتاللوجستية) Wadi Kabir Company has been repeatedly found attempting to smuggle weapons to the Houthis. *The most recent instance was in March 2023 when the company's trucks were intercepted while transporting generators from Oman to a warehouse in Sana'a, also owned by Wadi Kabir. *The generators were hollowed out and contained 52 Iranian-made anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), along with a smaller generator that could make the larger generator appear normal if suspicious inspectors attempted to test it. A UN report noted that prior to this incident, Wadi Kabir "had been involved in smuggling activities for the Houthis."

This is the background photo of Wadi Kabir Company's Facebook page. The UN report indicated that the truck received generators containing anti-tank missiles from Rabia Company. Rabia is likely the "Rabia Modern Investment Company" registered in Oman, established in September 2022 by two Yemeni nationals around 35 years old, a-Hassan Muhammad Abdel-Karim al-Makhdi (الحسن محمد عبد الكريم الماخذي) and Adul Rahman Muhammad Saghir al-Usaimi (عبدالرحمن محمد صغير العصيمي). According to the UN report, the owners of Rabia also own Wadi al-Kabir, although Rabia has no digital footprint aside from its business registration in Oman, Wadi al-Kabir has a larger digital footprint, albeit still small. Wadi al-Kabir created a Twitter account in November 2020 but has not been active since December 2020. The account has fewer than 12 followers, including a link to a defunct company website (http://wadikabir.com/) that is no longer operational. The company's Facebook is more active than its Twitter, with the most recent post in August 2023, garnering over 700 likes. However, its posts contain almost no business-related content (e.g., no pricing, sales, detailed service descriptions, etc.). The Facebook page and Twitter account link to the same closed website, and the company has only posted one comment in over three years. Despite these companies appearing active on the surface, their negligible efforts in digital marketing or establishing any form of online presence support the notion that their social media profiles are designed to provide a thin cover for smuggling activities.

Conclusion
This report identifies Houthi officials and entities engaged in procurement and acquisition to support the regime's dangerous ambitions. What the report reveals is likely just the tip of the iceberg of the Houthis' clandestine procurement operations. The identified individuals are senior officials who have staff and connections both within the region and beyond, partnering with rogue regimes and criminal actors to fund and arm the extremist Houthi movement. Given their ranks, uniforms, and positions in the logistics/procurement departments, it is difficult to argue that the individuals mentioned in this report are not involved in activities that promote the Houthi war effort and domestic repression. Furthermore, there is a clear precedent for sanctioning them. Saleh Mesfer al-Shaer has funded military procurement using the regime's ill-gotten gains, leading the U.S. government to sanction him under Executive Order 13611 for engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, it remains unclear why al-Shaer's brother, his deputy, and others assisting him have not yet been designated by the U.S. Treasury. Given the nature of international supply chains, clandestine procurement is precisely the type of rogue activity that exposure and identification may be particularly effective responses to. For example, the precision long-range cruise missiles the Houthis use to intimidate their Yemeni compatriots and Gulf neighbors cannot be entirely produced in Yemen. However, to prevent key components from falling into the hands of the Houthis, vigilance must be maintained, as illicit international supply chains can be easily exposed or disrupted, but it should be anticipated that these supply chains will be reconfigured to evade any new enforcement measures. Disrupting the Houthis' international business and procurement activities will be an important component of a broader strategy to apply pressure on the organization. Direct pressure may not guarantee positive results for the U.S. and its allies regarding the Houthis, but it is hard to imagine how this could be achieved without such pressure.

Appendix 1 - Timeline of the Logistics and Supply Council of the Ministry of Interior

Appendix 2 - Procurement hierarchy of the Ministry of Defense

Some key findings

AQAP is highly defensive against U.S. drone strikes and warns its members to avoid acquiring location intelligence by prohibiting the use of telecommunications and forbidding sharing operational activities with "military partners" or soldier peers who might "say too much." Many of the organization's high-profile commanders and theorists have successfully become targets of drone strikes and have been killed, such as Nasser al-Wuhayshi.
AQAP claimed in a 38-minute video that alleged Arab spies have infiltrated their ranks, directly supporting the location intelligence for drone strikes, verifying ground targets, and relaying that information back for targeted eliminations.
In contrast, the official propaganda of the Houthi organization is an offensive against airstrikes. The Houthis utilize propaganda videos, speeches, and infographics to boost morale and counter the threat of drones.

Houthi propaganda "offensive"
According to open-source monitoring of Houthi media, the organization appears to be attempting to convince movement members and sympathizers that the Houthis have the capability to defend against the threats posed by drone strikes. Between October 2017 and January 2018, the Houthis published video clips on their social media networks claiming to have brought down U.S. reconnaissance drones that they said had fallen from the sky. Senior Houthi political bureau official Muhammad Al-Bukhaithi stated in an interview, "The U.S. does not strike us with airstrikes or drones, but they support Saudi Arabia with our positions." He also stated that the U.S. is "providing weapons to the Saudi-led coalition."

The following are screenshots of video clips shared on Houthi Telegram and related websites of a drone allegedly shot down in Sana'a. They claim that the Houthi MQ-9 was shot down on October 1, 2017. The footage shows that the Houthis allegedly obtained weapons capable of striking drones, indicating that the organization may have the ability to destroy conventional threats. However, it should be noted that the photos provided by the Houthis in their drone propaganda do not match the silhouette of the MQ-9.

Houthi drone propaganda October 2017/January 2018 - Note that the wings are not vertical to the body, and in the photo of the alleged drone in the sky, the tail is much shorter.

On November 24, 2018, the Houthi organization claimed to have destroyed two drones belonging to the Saudi-led coalition off the western coast of Yemen. The following images were disseminated through Houthi-operated Masirah news website, in addition to the Houthi open-source network. As shown in the images below, the drones are "smaller" drones. There is also a video on the official Houthi Telegram channel detailing the drones. This indicates that the Houthis want their followers to believe that the organization has the capability to destroy drones of various sizes, but one cannot draw definitive conclusions based solely on propaganda.

Images can easily be manipulated in various ways. It should also be noted that drones can crash on their own—especially small drones, and one must be skeptical about equating the wreckage of a self-crashed drone with being shot down. In particular, six-axis quadcopters are prone to losing control, and there is no open-source evidence to prove that the Houthis shot down these small drones.

In 2017, the Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi-led coalition drones. However, these photos do not prove that the drones were shot down, nor can it be definitively stated to whom they belonged.

On June 7, 2019, the Houthi organization reported on its official Telegram channel that they had destroyed an American MQ-9 drone over the western coast of Yemen. The following screenshot shows the notification sent to its followers:

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed in a press release on June 16 that an MQ-9 drone was shot down on June 6, with a suspected Houthi-operated SA-6 surface-to-air missile onboard. CENTCOM further noted that "the altitude of the engagement indicates an improvement compared to previous Houthi capabilities," which the U.S. assesses as a result of Iranian material support.

Therefore, there is reason to believe that the Houthis have made some progress in military capabilities and weapon systems, posing risks to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. operations in Yemen. It must be noted that the Houthis did not disclose the weapons they used to shoot down the drone.

AQAP: Fatigued by drone warfare?
The strategy of the Houthis is starkly different from that of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. On January 17, 2018, the AQAP branch released a 38-minute video emphasizing the need to control internal communications to avoid interception by intelligence agencies. This indicates that the organization is under threat without military means to counter it.

The January 2018 video has a dramatic title, "Secrets, Its [original text] Dangers and Our Best Exit." The video was disseminated through social media and open-source channels. Between the lines, the message is that AQAP is experiencing drone strike fatigue and feels the need to release a video to warn a broader audience of the dangers. It also indirectly targets other "jihadist" organizations/affiliates of Al-Qaeda as a lesson.

Ibrahim Abu Saleh, top. Ibrahim Al Qosi Ibrahim Abu Saleh warns in the video: "Summarizing the numerous reasons for the enemy's ability to kill, imprison, or disrupt jihadist plans includes negligence and failure to keep secrets." Ibrahim Abu Saleh continues to warn AQAP's followers that secrets are exposed through casual gatherings and the use of phones. Additionally, Ibrahim Al Qosi calls on fighters to "keep their tongues" and not "accidentally say a word" that could expose the organization's military activities.

The AQAP video shows six alleged spies held by AQAP discussing how they infiltrated Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen and attempted to verify targets for drone strikes. The "spies" could have been instructed on what to say in front of the camera—importantly, AQAP even produced a video with this message, featuring numerous participants.

These six are listed by AQAP as "spies," and they continue to recount how they obtained intelligence for targeted eliminations. AQAP now deletes the Telegram channel that claims to release prisoners if they provide valuable information that the organization can use, but this information cannot be independently verified.

Ibrahim Al Qosi states: "Secrets through jihadists will generally be exposed, or spread through phones, which are considered their own spies." AQAP's video shows Faris Qasimi, a so-called spy, according to a member of the organization, who killed an Al-Qaeda official by planting an electronic chip, leading to a strike. Qasimi states that small amounts of information leaked by ordinary AQAP foot soldiers can provide a leader's location or indicate changes in the battlefield command structure. Qasimi also explains that he was instructed not to ask too many questions when initially joining AQAP, to build trust, and then to ask certain questions. Again, it is difficult to assess the authenticity of the statements made by the detained men.

AQAP foot soldiers as intelligence targets?
In the video, two of the six alleged spies state that they were instructed to target foot soldiers who typically always have their smartphones open. The accused spies wait for a critical moment to ask regular foot soldiers for someone's phone number. The spies would then call that person, confirming that the number of the intended target has been verified and is the correct person. Allegedly, that number is then shared with intelligence agencies.

The video categorizes Al-Qaeda soldiers into the following three categories:

AQAP members who are easy to talk to and will tell you everything they know. This AQAP member boasts about his knowledge to a second person or at an AQAP fighter's gathering.
AQAP members who say something only when asked and investigated.
AQAP members who remain silent and do not discuss anything.

The second spy boasted in the video that during phone conversations, Al-Qaeda foot soldiers provided valuable information. For example, "We have brothers traveling and may go through you" is information that the so-called spy explained. "Abu Ali al-Tayzi is no longer the emir; he has been replaced by Abdullah al-Asani," is also information provided for intelligence personnel.

Phone and social media accounts
According to the AQAP video, a man referred to as Al-Buraydi explains that phones are the primary means of obtaining intelligence. "Eavesdropping, drone strikes, and easy location tracking," Al-Buraydi summarizes the utility of phones. Mobile phone signals provide intelligence agencies with the ability to intercept communications, monitor conversations, and, if necessary, locate the phone, leading to drone strikes.

As Al-Buraydi confirms, social media account verification is another means of intelligence gathering. Al-Buraydi claims he was tasked with identifying the aliases and social media accounts of Al-Qaeda foot soldiers so that intelligence analysts could continue monitoring them. Since some social media accounts analysts may follow could go dormant over time, the so-called spies' task is to find out whether a new alias is being used online, what platform it is using, and whether there are any mistakes in usage due to a lack of internet connectivity, etc., he states in the video.

(1) U.S.-UK three rounds of strikes

At 2:30 AM local time on January 12, 2024, the U.S. and the UK launched the first round of joint strikes against the Houthi forces, aimed at destroying the Houthis' radar systems, air defense systems, and storage and launch sites for drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. This strike initially identified 16 strike locations and identified an additional 12 suspected strike locations within half an hour of the strike. Relevant locations included military bases near Sana'a airport, military facilities near Taiz airport, Houthi naval bases in Al Hudaydah, and other military sites in Hajjah province, totaling over 60 strike targets.

Subsequently, at 3:45 AM local time on January 13, the U.S. missile destroyer USS Carney launched a Tomahawk missile for an additional strike against a Houthi radar station. The New York Times reported that after this strike, the Houthi organization retained about 75% of its attack capability.

> Figure 1 F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet taking off from the deck of the USS Eisenhower.

Figure 2 British Typhoon fighter jet targeting satellite coordinates (16.018755°, 43.032625°).

Figure 3 Comparison before and after the first round of strikes 1 (upper half before the strike, lower half after the strike).

Figure 4 Comparison before and after the first round of strikes 2 (upper half before the strike, lower half after the strike).

Figure 5 Comparison before and after the first round of strikes 3 (upper half before the strike, lower half after the strike; left image is comparison before and after the radar facility strike).

The Houthi-controlled areas primarily located in the western part of Yemen facing the Red Sea, which lies between Northeast Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, connects to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal to the north and to the Gulf of Aden via the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to the south. This area is a maritime thoroughfare for ships traveling between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and is also a geopolitical focal point for great power competition. The targeted vessels are mostly located 30-80 nautical miles off the Red Sea coast. The shipping crisis facing the Red Sea has heightened security risks in the Red Sea and surrounding waters, significantly impacting and disrupting international supply chains, leading several shipping giants to suspend routes through the Red Sea and reroute via the Cape of Good Hope and other routes.

Over 60 targets, including Houthi command posts, ammunition depots, launch systems, and radar stations, were precisely struck. On January 12, the U.S.-UK coalition struck multiple locations controlled by the Houthis, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands. The U.S.-led coalition used over 100 precision-guided munitions to strike over 60 targets, including 16 Houthi command posts, ammunition depots, launch systems, production facilities, and air defense radar systems. Remote sensing images show that targets such as the Al Hudaydah airport shelter were accurately hit at critical points, resulting in severe damage, indicating high precision in U.S. air and naval strikes.

Next situation assessment
Against the backdrop of the unresolved new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, anti-Israel sentiments are rising in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and Houthi attacks are likely to strengthen their domestic political position, increasing their leverage in internal political maneuvering and power distribution in Yemen. Currently, both sides are unwilling to compromise, and it is assessed that the Houthis will continue to launch attacks against U.S.-UK coalition vessels and Western commercial ships, with the possibility of expanding the strike range to the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and surrounding waters, provoking more intense suppression from the West. In the context of multiple concurrent situations such as Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine, the U.S. is likely to avoid ground troop deployment to prevent getting bogged down in war, primarily utilizing naval and air power to strike major military targets of the Houthis and even Iran, which supports the Houthis. However, such strikes may provoke a united resistance from Middle Eastern armed factions like Hezbollah.

According to open-source information on this topic, as part of the Saudi-led Yemeni coalition, AQAP seems to feel fatigued by U.S. drone strikes and airstrikes. On the other hand, the Houthis are attempting to signal to their followers—and observers of the conflict—that the aerial threat is being militarily addressed.

AQAP also sent an open letter dated December 2018 to all fighters, prohibiting the use of social media and mobile communications, which could explain a decrease in activity on AQAP's official Telegram and other affiliated accounts.

On May 31, at 09:32, media outlets such as AFP reported that the UK Ministry of Defence and U.S. Central Command issued statements indicating that the British Air Force and U.S. forces conducted joint operations, striking 13 Houthi targets to weaken their capacity to continue attacking international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
On May 31, at 19:47, Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree stated that the U.S.-UK strikes resulted in at least 16 deaths and multiple injuries in Yemen, and in response to the U.S.-UK airstrikes, the Houthis attacked the U.S. aircraft carrier "Eisenhower."
On June 1, at 03:21, U.S. Department of Defense officials stated that no attack on the "Eisenhower" aircraft carrier was detected.
On June 1, at 09:27, U.S. Central Command stated that multiple Houthi drones were destroyed.

MQ-9 Reaper drone.

On June 2, at 05:52, the Yemeni Houthis claimed to have attacked the U.S. "Eisenhower" aircraft carrier again.
On June 2, at 07:08, U.S. forces stated that the Yemeni Houthis launched anti-ship missiles towards the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

February 12, 2024, Monday

On January 12, 2024, the destroyer "Gravely" launched Tomahawk missiles at the positions of the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. (The following is a record of every instance since last October when U.S. naval vessels or aircraft intercepted Houthi attacks, as well as every instance of U.S. and allied counterattacks against Houthi positions in Yemen.)

June 2024

On June 2, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a drone over the southern Red Sea.

On June 1, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed an aerial drone over the southern Red Sea and observed two other drones crashing into the Red Sea.

U.S. forces also launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles in the southern Red Sea, which U.S. Central Command stated were fired towards the destroyer Gravely.

On May 29, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed two drones launched from Yemen over the Red Sea.

On May 28, 2024: The Houthis launched five anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen towards the Red Sea. A Greek bulk carrier, M/V Laax, was hit by three missiles but continued to sail. No casualties were reported among U.S., coalition, or commercial vessels.

U.S. forces also destroyed five drones over the Red Sea launched from Yemen.

Additionally, U.S. forces destroyed two missile launchers in Yemen, after which the Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen.

On May 27, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a drone launched from Yemen over the Red Sea.

On May 26, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a drone launched from Yemen over the Red Sea.

On May 25, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles towards the Red Sea. No casualties or losses were reported among U.S., coalition, or commercial vessels.

On May 23, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles towards the Red Sea. No casualties or property losses were reported among U.S., coalition, or commercial vessels. Later, U.S. forces encountered a land-attack cruise missile in Yemen.

On May 22, 2024: U.S. forces engaged four drones in Yemen. The engagement occurred just days after the destroyer Carney returned home after months of deployment, defending against missile and drone attacks launched by the Houthis.

On April 25, 2024: The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile towards the Gulf of Aden. No casualties or property losses were reported. Later, U.S. forces destroyed a surface drone and an aerial drone in Yemen.

On April 24, 2024: A coalition vessel engaged an anti-ship ballistic missile launched from Yemen over the Gulf of Aden, which U.S. Central Command stated was likely targeting the U.S. merchant vessel M/V Yorktown. No casualties or property losses were reported. Later, U.S. forces destroyed four drones in Yemen.

On February 24, 2024, British forces launched strikes against Houthi targets from the Royal Air Force base in Akrotiri, Cyprus, in the Mediterranean. Four Royal Air Force Typhoon jets, supported by two Voyager tankers, deliberately struck Houthi positions in Yemen.

Additionally, the Navy announced that combat awards would be given to sailors serving in the Red Sea region.

On April 16, 2024: U.S. forces engaged two drones in Yemen.

From April 13 to 14, 2024: Iran launched a direct attack on Israel for the first time. U.S. forces and their allies destroyed approximately 80 drones and at least six ballistic missiles aimed at attacking Israel from Iran and Yemen. This included a ballistic missile on a launcher and seven drones on the ground in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

According to officials, the 494th and 335th Fighter Squadrons participated in defending against the attacks. The Washington Post reported that these squadrons used F-15E Strike Eagles to shoot down the drones. The destroyers Carney and Laboon shot down multiple ballistic missiles during the attack, while U.S. forces stationed in Erbil, Iraq, shot down another missile using the Patriot missile defense system.

The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden, while U.S. forces destroyed four drones in Yemen.

On April 11, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed an anti-ship ballistic missile over the Red Sea.

On April 10, 2024: U.S. forces engaged three drones, two of which were launched over the Gulf of Aden, and one over the Red Sea. Later, U.S. forces destroyed eight drones in Yemen.

On April 9, 2024: The destroyer Mason shot down an incoming anti-ship ballistic missile over the Gulf of Aden, which U.S. Central Command stated was likely targeting the U.S. merchant vessel M/V Yorktown. No casualties or losses were reported.

Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Mason.

On April 8, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a surface-to-air missile system with two missiles ready for launch, a ground control station in Yemen, and a drone over the Red Sea.

On April 7, 2024: The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile towards the Gulf of Aden while a coalition vessel was escorting a cargo ship flying the flag of the Marshall Islands, owned by the UK and operated by Italy, named "Hope Island." No casualties or property losses were reported.

On April 6, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a mobile surface-to-air missile system in Yemen and a drone over the Red Sea. A coalition vessel also destroyed an incoming anti-ship missile.

On April 4, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed an anti-ship missile.

On April 3, 2024: The destroyer Gravely and U.S. forces destroyed an anti-ship ballistic missile and two drones launched by the Houthis towards U.S. vessels in the Red Sea. U.S. forces also destroyed a mobile surface-to-air missile system in Houthi-controlled areas.

Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Gravely.

On April 1, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a ground drone.

March 2024

On March 30, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed two aerial drones, one over the Red Sea and the other on the ground in Yemen preparing for launch.

On March 28, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed four drones launched by the Houthis over the Red Sea targeting a U.S. warship and a coalition vessel.

On March 27, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed four drones launched by the Houthis over the Red Sea targeting a U.S. warship.

On March 23, 2024: The Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles near the tanker "Huangpu," a Liberian-flagged tanker owned and operated by China. U.S. Central Command stated that a fifth ballistic missile was fired at the vessel but caused minimal damage. The fire was quickly extinguished, and no casualties were reported.

Additionally, the destroyer Carney and other U.S. forces engaged six drones over the southern Red Sea, five of which fell into the sea, while one flew inland towards Yemen.

Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

On March 22, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed four drones in Yemen and attacked three underground storage facilities. Meanwhile, the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen towards the Red Sea, but no casualties or losses were reported.

On March 21, 2024: Coalition aircraft destroyed a ground drone, and the coalition destroyed two anti-ship ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis from Yemen towards the Red Sea.

On March 20, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed a ground drone, and a coalition aircraft destroyed an aerial drone.

On March 18, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed seven anti-ship missiles, three drones, and three weapons storage containers in Yemen.

On March 16, 2024: The Houthis launched two drones from Yemen towards the Red Sea, one of which was destroyed by U.S. forces, while the other reportedly fell into the water, according to U.S. Central Command. Later, U.S. forces destroyed five ground drones and one aerial drone in Yemen.

On March 15, 2024: The Houthis launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen towards the Red Sea, but no casualties or losses were reported.

From March 14 to 15, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden and another two towards the Red Sea, but no reports of injuries or damage to U.S. or coalition vessels were made. U.S. forces also destroyed nine anti-ship missiles and two drones in Yemen.

On March 13, 2024: The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden, but it did not hit any vessels and caused no casualties or losses. U.S. forces subsequently destroyed four drones and a surface-to-air missile in Yemen.

On March 12, 2024: The Houthis launched a close-range ballistic missile from Yemen towards the U.S. destroyer Laboon in the Red Sea, but it did not hit the vessel, and no casualties or damage were reported. Later, U.S. forces and a coalition vessel destroyed two drones launched from Yemen.

Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

On March 11, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles at the commercial vessel "Pinocchio" in the Red Sea, but they did not hit the Liberian-flagged vessel owned and operated by Singapore.

Subsequently, U.S. forces in Yemen shot down an underwater drone and 18 anti-ship missiles.

On March 9, 2024: U.S. Navy vessels and aircraft, along with several coalition naval vessels and aircraft, shot down 28 aerial attack drones launched by the Houthis towards the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

> Map showing Yemen and its capital Sana'a.

On March 8, 2024: U.S. forces struck two truck-mounted anti-ship missiles in Yemen. Later, the Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles towards the M/V Propel Fortune, a Greek-flagged grain transport vessel, but did not hit the vessel.

On March 7, 2024: U.S. Central Command forces shot down four Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one Houthi aerial attack drone in Yemen.

U.S. forces also shot down three aerial attack drones launched by the Houthis towards the Gulf of Aden.

According to U.S. Central Command, the events of the day lasted less than two hours.

The Battle of the Gulf of Aden is historically significant.

It is believed that the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels are the first entity in history to launch anti-ship ballistic missiles in a conflict.

On March 6, 2024: The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen towards a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden, resulting in the deaths of three crew members. This incident marks the first fatal attack in the Houthis' offensive operations. The attack targeted the M/V True Confidence, a Liberian-flagged bulk carrier owned by Liberia, which resulted in at least four crew members being injured, three of whom were in critical condition.

Subsequently, U.S. forces in Yemen attacked two drones, with Central Command stating that this posed an imminent threat to vessels in the region.

On March 5, 2024: The destroyer Carney shot down an anti-ship ballistic missile and three drones launched by the Houthis in the Red Sea.

Subsequently, U.S. forces destroyed three anti-ship missiles and three surface drones.

Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Carney.

On March 4, 2024: The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen towards the southern Red Sea, but the missile hit the surface without causing any damage or casualties. Later, the Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen towards the M/V MSC SKY II, a Liberian-flagged container ship owned by Switzerland. One missile hit the vessel, causing damage.

U.S. forces subsequently launched two anti-ship cruise missiles, with Central Command stating that this posed a threat to vessels in the region.

On March 2, 2024: On February 18, the Belize-flagged bulk carrier M/V Rubymar sank in the Red Sea after being attacked by the Houthis. Central Command stated that the fertilizer carried by the vessel posed an "environmental risk" to the Red Sea, and the wreck posed a "submerged collision risk" to other vessels traversing that waterway.

The Italian Ministry of Defense stated that its destroyer Caio Duilio shot down a drone that was suspected of flying towards it in the Red Sea.

On March 1, 2024: U.S. forces struck a missile prepared to be launched from Yemen towards the Red Sea. Subsequently, the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile towards the M/V Torm Thor, a vessel flying the flag of the Marshall Islands, but the missile hit the surface.

On February 29, 2024: U.S. forces shot down a drone in the southern Red Sea. Later, U.S. Central Command stated that U.S. forces struck six mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched towards the Red Sea.

On February 27, 2024: U.S. aircraft and a coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack drones in the Red Sea.

The German frigate Hessen engaged two enemy drones. It also mistakenly fired at a U.S. MQ-9 drone twice, but neither hit the target.

On February 26, 2024: U.S. forces destroyed three surface drones and two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched towards the Red Sea. Central Command stated that they also destroyed a one-way attack drone over the Red Sea.

On February 24, 2024: The destroyer Mason shot down an anti-ship ballistic missile launched by the Houthis from Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden. Central Command stated that the missile was likely targeting the U.S. tanker M/V Torm Thor.

Subsequently, U.S. forces shot down two one-way attack drones and four mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched towards vessels in the Red Sea.

On February 23, 2024: U.S. forces shot down three Houthi one-way attack drones near several commercial vessels in the Red Sea.

Subsequently, U.S. forces destroyed seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched towards the Red Sea.

On February 22, 2024: U.S. aircraft and a coalition warship shot down six Houthi one-way attack drones in the Red Sea, which U.S. Central Command stated were likely targeting U.S. and coalition warships. Later, the Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from southern Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden. The missiles hit the M/V Islander, a vessel flying the flag of Barbados and owned by the UK. This resulted in one person being slightly injured and minor damage.

The French military also stated that it shot down two Houthi drones in the southern Red Sea.

Subsequently, U.S. forces attacked four drones and two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched from Yemen towards the Red Sea.

On February 21, 2024: U.S. forces struck seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one mobile anti-ship ballistic missile launcher prepared to be launched towards the Red Sea. Central Command forces also shot down a one-way attack drone system.

From February 19 to 20, 2024: U.S. and coalition aircraft and warships shot down ten one-way attack drones in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The destroyer Laboon also detected an incoming anti-ship cruise missile and subsequently shot it down.

Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

On February 19, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen towards the M/V Sea Champion, a Greek-flagged grain transport vessel owned by the U.S. This caused minor damage, but no casualties were reported. U.S. forces subsequently destroyed a surface-to-air missile launcher in Yemen. U.S. Central Command also reported that an anti-ship ballistic missile was launched but did not hit any commercial or coalition vessels.

Subsequently, a one-way attack drone struck the M/V Navis Fortuna, a U.S.-owned bulk carrier flying the flag of the Marshall Islands. The drone caused minor damage, with no injuries reported. U.S. forces later destroyed another drone preparing to launch towards vessels in the Red Sea.

The U.S. Department of Defense also acknowledged that a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone crashed near the Red Sea in Houthi-controlled territory, with preliminary indications suggesting that the drone was shot down by a Houthi surface-to-air missile.

On February 18, 2024: The Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles at the M/V Rubymar, a British-owned bulk carrier flying the flag of Belize. One missile hit the vessel and caused damage.

Undated satellite images show the damaged M/V Rubymar.

On February 17, 2024: U.S. forces attacked three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one surface drone, and one underwater drone in Yemen, with Central Command stating that this was the first observation of the Houthis using underwater drones since the attacks began in October 2023.

On February 16 to 17, 2024: U.S. forces struck a mobile anti-ship cruise missile and a mobile surface drone. Additionally, the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen towards the Red Sea, three of which were assessed to be aimed at the M/T Pollux, a merchant vessel flying the flag of Panama and registered in Denmark. No casualties or property losses were reported.

On February 15, 2024: U.S. forces struck three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched towards vessels in the Red Sea. Additionally, the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen towards the M/V Lycavitos, a British-owned and operated bulk carrier flying the flag of Barbados. The vessel reported no casualties during the attack but sustained minor damage and continued sailing.

On February 14, 2024: U.S. forces struck seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, three mobile drones, and one explosive surface drone prepared to be launched towards vessels in the Red Sea.

On February 13, 2024: U.S. forces struck a mobile anti-ship cruise missile prepared to be launched towards vessels in the Red Sea. Later, the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen. U.S. Navy vessels tracked the missile but took no action as it was expected not to hit any vessels nearby.

On February 12, 2024: Houthi militants launched two missiles towards the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait from Yemen. Both missiles were aimed at the M/V Star Iris, a Greek-owned cargo ship flying the flag of the Marshall Islands, which was transporting corn from Brazil through the Red Sea to Iran. The vessel reported that it was in good condition, with minor damage and no injuries to the crew.

On February 10, 2024: U.S. forces struck two surface drones and three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched towards vessels in the Red Sea. Central Command did not disclose which U.S. assets were involved in these strikes.

A-10 Warthog.

On February 9, 2024: U.S. forces struck two mobile surface drones, four mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, and one mobile ground attack cruise missile that were preparing to be launched towards vessels in the Red Sea. Central Command did not disclose which U.S. assets were involved in these strikes.

On February 8, 2024: U.S. forces conducted seven strikes against four Houthi surface drones and seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to be launched towards vessels in the Red Sea.

On February 7, 2024: U.S. Central Command forces conducted "self-defense" strikes against two Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missiles prepared for launch. Later, U.S. Central Command forces conducted another strike against a Houthi mobile ground attack cruise missile prepared for launch. U.S. Central Command did not disclose which U.S. assets were involved in these strikes.

On February 6, 2024: Houthi militants launched six anti-ship ballistic missiles towards the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The destroyer Laboon shot down a missile attempting to hit the M/V Star Nasia, a Greek-owned bulk carrier flying the flag of the Marshall Islands, which was transiting the Gulf of Aden.

Since last October, the surface fleet has shot down dozens of attack drones and missiles, while other missiles targeted the M/V Morning Tide, a British-owned cargo ship sailing in the southern Red Sea, but did not hit the vessel.

Confirmed U.S. assets involved: USS Laboon.

On February 5, 2024: U.S. Central Command conducted a self-defense strike against two Houthi personnel carrying explosive-laden drones.

On February 4, 2024: U.S. Central Command struck Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and ground attack cruise missiles. Subsequently, U.S. forces struck four anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared for launch.

On February 3, 2024: U.S. Central Command struck six Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles prepared for launch towards vessels in the Red Sea. Subsequently, U.S. and coalition forces struck 36 Houthi targets at 13 locations in Yemen controlled by Iranian-backed Houthis.

On February 2, 2024: The destroyer Carney engaged and